Pepperdine Law Review
Volume 2020

Issue 1

Article 1

12-1-2020

“Magic Words” and Original Understanding: An Amplified Clear
Statement Rule to Abrogate Tribal Sovereign Immunity
Justin W. Aimonetti

Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.pepperdine.edu/plr
Part of the Indigenous, Indian, and Aboriginal Law Commons, and the Legislation Commons

Recommended Citation
Justin W. Aimonetti “Magic Words” and Original Understanding: An Amplified Clear Statement Rule to
Abrogate Tribal Sovereign Immunity, 2020 Pepp. L. Rev. 1 (2020)
Available at: https://digitalcommons.pepperdine.edu/plr/vol2020/iss1/1

This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Caruso School of Law at Pepperdine Digital
Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in Pepperdine Law Review by an authorized editor of Pepperdine
Digital Commons. For more information, please contact bailey.berry@pepperdine.edu.

“Magic Words” and Original
Understanding: An Amplified Clear
Statement Rule to Abrogate Tribal
Sovereign Immunity
“There is not one example in all of history where the Supreme Court has
found that Congress intended to abrogate tribal sovereign immunity without
expressly mentioning Indian tribes somewhere in the statute.” 1

Abstract
The Indian plenary power doctrine—an invention of the late nineteenthcentury Supreme Court—grants Congress exclusive authority to legislate with
respect to Indian tribes, including the ability to abrogate tribal sovereign
immunity. Under current doctrine, Congress must “unequivocally express”
its intent to abrogate the sovereign immunity of Indian tribes with “explicit
legislation.” Circuit courts tasked with applying this standard have split on
the level of textual specificity required to strip tribes of their immunity.
Employing the tools of statutory construction, courts are divided over whether
the term ‘domestic government,’ as found in Section 106 of the Bankruptcy
Code, unequivocally covers Indian tribes. Because the purported power
Congress exercises to abrogate tribal sovereign immunity is constitutionally
dubious as an original matter, this Article contends that courts should only
find abrogation when Congress leaves no doubt that it is acting in reliance
upon that power. Specifically, the persuasive originalist critique of the Indian
plenary power doctrine’s historical incorrectness licenses the adoption of a
“magic words” clear statement rule. Under the proposed rule, Congress must
expressly mention ‘Indian tribes’ or a closely associated term somewhere in
the statute’s text to effectuate the abrogation of a tribe’s sovereign immunity.
1. Meyers v. Oneida Tribe of Indians of Wis., 836 F.3d 818, 824 (7th Cir. 2016) (quoting In re
Greektown Holdings, LLC, 532 B.R. 680, 693 (E.D. Mich. 2015)).
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I.

INTRODUCTION

In American law, Indian tribes are separate, independent “sovereigns with
a direct relationship” to the federal government.2 As a consequence, Indian
tribes ordinarily enjoy sovereign immunity from suit.3 Congress, however,
occasionally sees fit to abrogate this immunity.4 Yet under the Supreme
Court’s current doctrine, Congress must “unequivocally express” its intent to
abrogate the sovereign immunity of Indian tribes with “explicit legislation.”5
The abrogation of Indian tribal sovereign immunity “cannot be implied.”6
Circuit courts tasked with applying this standard have split on the level of
textual specificity required to abrogate Indian tribal immunity. Specifically,
the Sixth Circuit and the Ninth Circuit are currently divided on whether the
term “domestic government,” as found in Section 106 of the Bankruptcy
Code, unequivocally covers Indian tribes.7
Section 106 of the Bankruptcy Code “abrogate[s]” the “sovereign

2. Sarah Krakoff, They Were Here First: American Indian Tribes, Race, and the Constitutional
Minimum,
69
STAN.
L.
REV.
491,
491
(2017);
see
also
Michael Bevilacqua, Silent Intent? Analyzing the Congressional Intent Required to Abrogate Tribal
Sovereign Immunity, 61 B.C. L. REV. E-Supplement II.-156, II.–156 (2020) (“Indian tribes have long
been considered distinct political communities that pre-exist the United States Constitution, and as
such, retain many of their rights to self-governance.”). I use the term “Indian tribe(s)” throughout this
Article, as the term is firmly ensconced in statutes, case law, and historical vocabulary. I also use the
term ‘tribe’ to describe Native polities of the late eighteenth-century founding era.
3. See Kiowa Tribe v. Mfg. Techs., 523 U.S. 751, 754 (1998) (explaining that Indian tribes can
only be sued under federal law if Congress has abrogated the tribe’s immunity or if the tribe has waived
its immunity).
4. Id.
5. Santa Clara Pueblo v. Martinez, 436 U.S. 49, 58–59 (1978); see also In re Platinum Oil
Properties, LLC, 465 B.R. 621, 642-43 (Bankr. D.N.M. 2011) (“Tribal sovereign immunity is not
absolute, however, and can be abrogated by Congress. Congressional abrogation of tribal sovereign
immunity must be explicit; abrogation may not be implied.”); Scott C. Hall, The Indian Law Canons
of Construction v. The Chevron Doctrine: Congressional Intent and the Unambiguous Answer to the
Ambiguous Problem, 37 CONN. L. REV. 495, 497 (2004) (noting that when congressional “intent can
be ascertained, the court will give it effect whether it is for or against the Indians, [but] [w]hen it
cannot be ascertained, the ambiguities are to be resolved in favor of the Indians”). But see Bryan H.
Wildenthal, Indian Sovereignty, General Federal Laws, and the Canons of Construction: An Overview
and Update, 6 AM. INDIAN L. J. 99, 163 (2017) (“It has been clear for more than 30 years that the
Supreme Court will not require an explicit statement in statutory text for Congress to limit tribal
rights.”) (emphasis in original).
6. Santa Clara Pueblo, 436 U.S. at 58.
7. In re Greektown Holdings, LLC, 917 F.3d 451, 457 (6th Cir. 2019) (noting that “this issue ‘has
been analyzed by a handful of courts, leading to two irreconcilable conclusions.’”) (citation omitted);
see also Meyers, 836 F.3d at 826 (“We need not weigh in on the conflict between these courts on how
to interpret the breadth the term ‘other domestic governments’ under the Bankruptcy Code.”).

3

[Vol. 2020: 1]

“Magic Words” and Original Understanding
PEPPERDINE LAW REVIEW

immunity” of “a governmental unit.”8 The term “governmental unit,” defined
in Section 101(27) of the Bankruptcy Code, comprises a long list of entities, 9
including any “foreign or domestic government.”10 As a matter of statutory
interpretation, the Ninth Circuit concluded that “domestic government”
covers Indian tribes.11 Any other interpretation, the Ninth Circuit reasoned,
would create surplusage, as no entity other than an Indian tribe can logically
be considered a domestic government.12 Taking the opposite position, the
Sixth Circuit instead held that “domestic government” does not unequivocally
abrogate tribal sovereign immunity.13 The Sixth Circuit’s underlying
rationale hinged on precedent, normative values, and historical practice—
namely, that Congress has never abrogated tribal sovereign immunity without
including magic words such as “tribe” or “Native American” in the statutory
text.14
In response to this entrenched circuit conflict, this Article argues that the
Sixth Circuit’s outcome is correct, but for a different reason: As the purported
power Congress employs to abrogate a tribe’s sovereign immunity is
constitutionally dubious as an original matter, courts should only find
abrogation when Congress leaves no doubt that it is acting in reliance upon
that power. Since the turn of the twentieth century, the Supreme Court has
recognized the Indian plenary power doctrine.15 That doctrine suggests that
8. 11 U.S.C. § 106(a) (2012); see also 1 ALAN N. RESNICK & HENRY J. SOMMER, COLLIER ON
BANKRUPTCY 1.01[l] (16th ed. 2011) (quoting Hanover Nat’1 Bank v. Moyses, 186 U.S. 181, 192
(1902)) (noting that “[b]ankruptcy legislation in the United States is the way ‘to grant a fresh start to
the honest but unfortunate debtor.’”); Stephan A. Hoover, Forcing the Tribe to Bet on the House: The
Limited Options and Risks to the Tribe when Indian Gaming Operations Seek Bankruptcy Relief, 49
CAL. W. L. REV. 269, 277 (2013) (“Although the legislative power to enact national bankruptcy laws
is enshrined in the Constitution, it was not until 1800 that Congress enacted the first federal bankruptcy
legislation.”).
9. Domestic government may plausibly be interpreted to include state or municipal governments.
Yet Section 101(27) explicitly lists both. See 11 U.S.C. § 101(27) (2012). Given the explicit mention
of both state and municipal governments, the Ninth Circuit deduced that a domestic government
logically must cover Indian tribes. See infra Part IV.
10. 11 U.S.C. § 101(27) (2012) (emphasis added).
11. See infra Part IV.
12. Id.
13. Id.
14. Id; see also Bevilacqua, supra note 2, at p. II.–157 (exploring the Sixth Circuit’s decision and
the case’s factual and procedural background).
15. For purposes of this Article, and to avoid any potential confusion, the plenary power doctrine
will be used in reference only to Congress’s exclusive authority over Indian affairs. See United States–
Crow Treaty –– Federal Indian Law –– Indian Plenary Power Doctrine –– Herrera v. Wyoming, 404
HARV. L. REV. 402, 407 (2019) [hereinafter United States–Crow Treaty] (using the phrase “the Indian
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“the Constitution grants Congress broad general powers to legislate in respect
to Indian tribes, powers that . . . have [been] consistently described as ‘plenary
and exclusive.’”16 Implicit in Congress’s broad inherent legislative power
over Indian tribes is Congress’s authority to abrogate tribal immunity. To put
it differently, the Indian plenary power doctrine is “premised on the . . .
absolute sovereignty of the United States” over the Indian tribes, inclusive of
the power to abrogate tribal immunity.17
As an original matter, the premise upon which the Indian plenary power
doctrine stands is unsteady.18 Even as originalists have increasingly
questioned the original correctness of the Indian plenary power doctrine,19 the
Court continues to adhere to the doctrine in part out of deference to stare
decisis.20 This Article asserts that original doubt about the correctness of the
Indian plenary power doctrine warrants the adoption of a magic words clear
statement rule.21 Courts, in other words, should intensify the linguistic trigger
that Congress must satisfy to exercise an inherent power it likely does not

plenary power doctrine”). Likewise, this Article, like Professor Sai Prakash’s Article, “uses ‘plenary
power’ in the sense in which the courts use it—that is, an all-encompassing legislative power that lacks
subject-matter limitations.” Saikrishna Prakash, Against Tribal Fungibility, 89 CORNELL L. REV.
1069, 1071 n.2 (2004).
16. United States v. Lara, 541 U.S. 193, 200 (2004).
17. United States–Crow Treaty, supra note 15, at 407.
18. The fact that some originalists exhibit trepidation when it comes to abrogating Indian tribal
immunity may be attributed to the originalist methodology. M. Alexander Pearl, Originalism and
Indians, 93 TUL. L. REV. 269, 294 (2018) (“Originalism is under-theorized as applied to tribal
sovereignty and the position of Indian tribes within the United States’ constitutional structure.”). The
originalist methodology presumes that the proper manner by which to interpret text “is
‘archaeological’—to dig up evidence regarding the meaning, intention, or purpose” of the text and the
text’s drafters at the time the drafting occurred. John C. Nagle, Waiving Sovereign Immunity in an
Age of Clear Statement Rules, 1995 WIS. L. REV. 772, 801 (1995).
19. See infra Part V.
20. See Amy C. Barrett, Stare Decisis and Due Process, 74 U. COLO. L. REV. 1011, 1016-38
(2003) (explaining the history and also the functional utility of stare decisis); see also Justin W.
Aimonetti, Second Guessing Double Jeopardy: The Stare Decisis Factors as Proxy Tools for Original
Correctness, 61 WM. & MARY L. REV. ONLINE 35 (2020) (exploring stare decisis and how the stare
decisis factors may be used to evaluate a precedent’s correctness as an original matter).
21. Clear statement rules are traditionally employed to “avoid applications of otherwise
unambiguous statutes that would intrude on sensitive domains in a way that Congress is unlikely to
have intended had it considered the matter.” Spector v. Norwegian Cruise Lines Ltd. 545 U.S. 119,
139 (2005) (“[C]lear statement rules ensure Congress does not, by broad or general language, legislate
on a sensitive topic inadvertently or without due deliberation.”); see also Amy C. Barrett, Substantive
Canons and Faithful Agency, 90 B.U. L. REV. 109, 118 (2010) (“Canons in this category are often
expressed as ‘clear statement rules’ that require a court to interpret a statute to avoid a particular result
unless Congress speaks explicitly to accomplish it.”).
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possess. That textual trigger should require Congress to expressly mention
Indian tribes or a closely associated term somewhere in the statute’s text to
abrogate tribal immunity.22 This clear statement rule ensures efficient
avoidance of potential constitutional violations and thus relates to “the
longstanding principle that courts should not lightly interpret a statute in a
way that makes it unconstitutional if some other interpretation is available.”23
Under the proposed rule, the legislature must use magic words (expressly
mentioning Indian tribes or a closely associated term) that leave no doubt
about Congress’s intent to abrogate tribal immunity.24 Additionally, this
interpretative principle reinforces the assessment that “an originalist view of
the Constitution can produce a constitutional understanding of Indian tribes
that actually supports a robust construction of tribal sovereignty.”25
In making this argument, this Article proceeds in four Parts. Part II
briefly details the history of tribal immunity to situate the doctrine in its
historical context. Part III explores the development of Congress’s plenary
power over tribal sovereignty. This Part also examines the Constitution’s text,

22. Bevilacqua, supra note 2, at p. II.–170 (noting that “it is difficult to imagine a scenario where
Congress unequivocally expresses an intent without mentioning Indian tribes by name”).
23. Caleb Nelson, Avoiding Constitutional Questions Versus Avoiding Unconstitutionality, 128
HARV. L. REV. F. 331, 331 (2015). This Article’s proposed rule importantly does not rest upon the
distinct canon of constitutional avoidance. That canon advances the “idea that courts should try to
interpret statutes so as to avoid raising difficult questions of constitutional law.” Id. By contrast, the
proposed rule argues that courts should force Congress to explicitly rely on a power it likely does not
possess by invoking the magic words in the statute’s text. I discuss the canon of constitutional
avoidance in further detail infra at note 176.
24. There is no reason why the Supreme Court—instead of opting for the costly decision of
overruling dubious precedents like the Indian plenary power doctrine—cannot instead extend clear
statement rules to limit the reach of likely originally incorrect precedent. Bryan H. Wildenthal, supra
note 5, at 163 n.271 (“The Supreme Court appeared to come close to such an explicit ‘plain statement’
rule, at least for treaty abrogation, in Justice William O. Douglas’s majority opinion in Menominee
Tribe v. United States.”). The Court’s current inquiry to determine whether a state’s immunity has
been abrogated tracks with this Article’s proposal. See Seminole Tribe v. Florida, 517 U.S. 44, 55
(1996) (citation omitted) (“In order to determine whether Congress has abrogated the States’ sovereign
immunity, we ask two questions: first, whether Congress has ‘unequivocally expressed its intent to
abrogate the immunity,’ and second, whether Congress has acted ‘pursuant to a valid exercise of
power.’”) (citations omitted). This Article, however, does recognize that the proposed rule may be
inconsistent with the Court’s statutory interpretation jurisprudence. See FAA v. Cooper, 566 U.S.
284, 291 (2018) (citing Richlin Sec. Serv. Co. v. Chertoff, 553 U.S. 571, 589 (2008)) (explaining that
the Court has never required Congress to state its intent in any particular manner, and that courts
should still use other tools of statutory construction in assessing congressional intent, even in the
sovereign immunity context). Nevertheless, the proposed rule is justified given the Indian plenary
power doctrine’s dubious original correctness.
25. Pearl, supra note 18, at 271.
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historical practice, judicial critiques, and academic scholarship to further call
into question the correctness of the plenary power doctrine as an original
matter. Part IV describes the current circuit split on the question whether
“domestic government” unequivocally covers Indian tribes. In conclusion,
Part V argues that so long as the Court adheres to the constitutionally dubious
plenary power doctrine, the Court should require that for Congress to abrogate
tribal sovereign immunity, it must satisfy a magic words clear statement rule
by expressly mentioning “Indian tribes” or a closely associated term in the
statute’s text.
II. THE DEEP HISTORICAL ROOTS OF TRIBAL SOVEREIGN IMMUNITY
Sovereign immunity’s general premise is simple—one cannot sue a
sovereign government.26 The doctrine protects sovereign governments “from
nonconsensual suit, except in certain narrowly prescribed circumstances.” 27
The origin of sovereign immunity predates the Constitution.28 Historians have
generally traced its roots to the English concept of the divine right of royalty,
in which the monarch could do no wrong and therefore no suit against the
monarchy could be legitimate.29 Regardless of its exact genesis, modern
26. See Ridge Howell, Overlooking Canon: How the Alabama Supreme Court Used a Footnote to
Disregard Tribal Sovereign Immunity in Wilkes v. PCI Gaming Authority, 43 AM. INDIAN L. REV.
437, 437 (2019). But see John Alan Cohan, Sovereignty in a Postsovereign World, 18 FLA. J. INT’L
L. 907, 909 (2006) (“Today, sovereignty is anything but simple. There is disagreement as to the nature
of sovereignty, whether it is a relevant sort of concept in geopolitics, and whether there is a one-sizefits all definition.”).
27. Andrea M. Seielstad, The Recognition and Evolution of Tribal Sovereign Immunity Under
Federal Law: Legal, Historical, and Normative Reflections on a Fundamental Aspect of American
Indian Sovereignty, 37 TULSA L. REV. 661, 662 (2013).
28. Alden v. Maine, 527 U.S. 706, 715 (1999) (“When the Constitution was ratified, it was well
established in English law that the Crown could not be sued without consent in its own courts.”); see
also Kyle S. Conway, Inherently or Exclusively Federal: Constitutional Preemption and
the Relationship Between Public Law 280 and Federalism, 15 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 1323, 1338 (2013)
(describing the American people’s understanding of sovereignty at the founding); THE FEDERALIST
NO. 81 (Alexander Hamilton) (noting that sovereign immunity “is the general sense, and the general
practice of mankind”).
29. See Daniel T. Murphy, The American Doctrine of Sovereign Immunity: An Historical Analysis,
13 VILL. L. REV. 583 (1968) (exploring the history of sovereign immunity in American jurisprudence).
Professor Katherine Florey’s research suggests that “the idea that sovereigns enjoy immunity from
suit under some circumstances is a well-entrenched jurisprudential notion, dating back at least to
medieval England.” Katherine J. Florey, Indian Country’s Borders: Territoriality, Immunity, and the
Construction of Tribal Sovereignty, 51 B.C. L. REV. 595, 616 (2010). There admittedly exists much
debate over where exactly the historical starting point should be temporally located. See Michalyn
Steele, Plenary Power, Political Questions, and Sovereignty in Indian Affairs, 63 UCLA L. REV. 666
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doctrine extends sovereign immunity to the federal government, state
governments, foreign governments, and to Indian tribes.30
Today, the Supreme Court rests the justification for tribal sovereign
immunity on the “common-law immunity from suit traditionally enjoyed by
sovereign powers.”31 Indian tribal immunity was historically understood as
an essential and inherent doctrine, that did not depend on colonial or federal
law for either its recognition or its scope.32 Even before the Court wielded the
judicial power of the United States, Indian tribes had long been recognized as
“separate sovereigns pre-existing the Constitution.”33
Professor Alexander Pearl has explained that the separate sovereign status
of Indian tribes is linked to the fact that “tribes predate[d] the Constitution and

(2016) (discussing the intellectual debate over both the origins and meaning of sovereignty). As the
Supreme Court explained in Nevada v. Hall, “[t]he doctrine of sovereign immunity is an amalgam of
two quite different concepts, one applicable to suits in the sovereign’s own courts and the other to suits
in the courts of another sovereign.” 440 U.S. 410, 414 (1979). But see Alden v. Maine, 527 U.S. 706,
728–29 (1999) (describing principles of state sovereign immunity as “fundamental postulates implicit
in the constitutional design”); Three Affiliated Tribes of the Fort Berthold Reservation v. Wold Eng’g,
476 U.S. 877, 890 (1986) (“The common law sovereign immunity possessed by the Tribe is a
necessary corollary to Indian sovereignty and self-governance.”).
30. See generally Katherine Florey, Sovereign Immunity’s Penumbras: Common Law, “Accident,”
and Policy in the Development of Sovereign Immunity Doctrine, 43 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 765 (2008)
(explaining sovereign immunity’s extensions).
31. Michigan v. Bay Mills Indian Cmty., 572 U.S. 782, 788 (2014) (quoting Santa Clara Pueblo v.
Martinez, 436 U.S. 49, 58 (1978)). As a dependent sovereign entity, an Indian tribe is not subject to
suit in a federal or state court unless the tribe’s sovereign immunity has been either abrogated by
Congress or waived by the tribe. See Miner Elec., Inc. v. Muscogee (Creek) Nation, 505 F.3d 1007,
1009–10 (10th Cir. 2007). It is also worth noting that when it comes to the origin of tribal sovereign
immunity, the Supreme Court has confusingly explained the doctrine’s evolution, stating in one case
that the doctrine “developed almost by accident.” Kiowa Tribe v. Mfg. Techs., Inc., 523 U.S. 751,
756–57 (1998) (citing Turner v. United States, 248 U.S. 354 (1919)); see also Florey, supra note 29,
at 596 (“the precise definition of the sovereignty tribes enjoy within the United States has long been
an uneasy matter.”).
32. Whitaker v. Dakota Finance Corp. (In re Whitaker), 474 B.R. 687, 690–91 (8th Cir. B.A.P.
2012) (citations, internal quotation marks and footnotes omitted) (“Unlike the immunity of states,
which derives from the Eleventh Amendment, the immunity of tribes is a matter of common law,
which has been recognized as integral to the sovereignty and self-governance of tribes.”); see also
Hoover, supra note 8, at 270 (“The United States has needed to integrate sovereign Indian nations into
the American system of jurisprudence since its inception.”).
33. Bay Mills Indian Cmty., 572 U.S. at 788 (quoting Santa Clara Pueblo, 436 U.S. at 56); see
also Rhode Island v. Narragansett Indian Tribe, 19 F.3d 685, 694 (1st Cir. 1994) (noting that tribal
immunity “predates the birth of the Republic.”); Robert J. Miller, Consultation or Consent: The United
States Duty to Confer with American Indian Governments, 91 N.D. L. REV. 37, 41 (2015) (“Long
before Europeans began colonizing North America, indigenous peoples and Indian nations governed
themselves through various governmental entities.”).
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European colonizers.”34 Upon arrival to North America, European settlers
“encountered hundreds of tribal nations possessing sovereignty over their
lands and their people.”35 These Indian peoples lived in distinct communities,
“created institutions and systems, and governed themselves, sharing territories
within North America prior to European contact.”36 As Chief Justice Marshall
explained in Worcester v. Georgia: “America, separated from Europe by a
wide ocean, was inhabited by a distinct people, divided into separate nations,
independent of each other and of the rest of the world, having institutions of
their own, and governing themselves by their own laws.”37
When early Europeans interacted with Indians, “treaty-making regulated
interactions and relationships between Indian nations and their people, on the
one hand, and European nations and their colonial settlers, on the other
hand.”38 As Indian tribes were understood to be sovereign separate nations,
Europeans formally dealt with the various tribes “solely by treaty.”39 These
treaties, although frequently ignored and often broken, reflected the European
settlers’ recognition of “the importance of cooperating with the powerful
Indian tribes, treating them as sovereigns possessing full rights of ownership
of lands and requiring negotiation and treaty-making.”40 From a legal
34. Pearl, supra note 18, at 271; see also Am. Indian Agric. Credit Consortium v. Standing Rock
Sioux Tribe, 780 F.2d 1374, 1378 (8th Cir. 1985) (citations omitted) (“Indian tribes enjoy immunity
because they are sovereigns predating the Constitution.”).
35. Angela R. Riley, Native Nations and the Constitution: An Inquiry into “ExtraConstitutionality,” 130 HARV. L. REV. F. 173, 179 (2017) [hereinafter Riley, Native Nations]; see also
Angela R. Riley, The History of Native American Lands and the Supreme Court, 38 J. SUP. CT. HIST.
369, 369 (2013) [hereinafter Riley, History of Native American Lands] (“When Europeans first made
contact with this continent, they encountered hundreds of indigenous, sovereign nations representing
enormous diversity in terms of language, culture, religion, and governance.”).
36. Seielstad, supra note 27, at 683.
37. Worcester v. Georgia, 31 U.S. 515, 542–43 (1832) (emphasis added).
38. Seielstad, supra note 27, at 683; see also Miller, supra note 33, at 43 (“England and the English
colonies, for example, signed scores of treaties with tribes on the east coast of North America, engaged
in extensive diplomatic relations with Indians, and in England, the Crown even received diplomatic
visits from North American tribal representatives.”).
39. Pearl, supra note 18, at 300; see also Riley, History of Native American Lands, supra note 35,
at 369 (noting that “[h]istorically, treaties were the primary mechanism for recognition of Indian
lands.”); Robert N. Clinton, The Road: Indian Tribes and Political Liberty, 47 U. CHI. L. REV. 846,
851 (1980) (“The Crown generally adhered to the view that, as separate peoples, the Indians were
politically and legally autonomous within their territory until they voluntarily ceded their land to the
Crown or were conquered in a just war, a view suggested by both international law and English
common law.”); Lance F. Sorenson, Tribal Sovereignty and the Recognition Power, 42 AM. INDIAN
L. REV. 69, 97 (2017) (“English colonial governments recognized the sovereignty of Native American
tribes and negotiated directly with them without much colonial coordination.”)
40. Seielstad, supra note 27, at 684; see also Robert A. Williams, Jr., “The People of the States
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perspective, “these treaties were properly [considered] ‘international
agreements’ since they involved European colonial sovereigns and indigenous
political entities.”41 Categorizing such treaties as international agreements
also meant that “the British Crown and several of its colonies dealt with the
Indian tribes as wholly independent foreign nations.”42 These Indian treaties
were thus “fundamental, constitutive document[s]” that affirmed the
sovereign status of the signatory tribes.43
Once the American Revolution sprung and the colonies cut the cord that
tied them to English control, the nascent states continued to treat the Indian
tribes as independent sovereign nations. The newly independent states, acting
together through the Continental Congress,44 entered into treaties with Indian
tribes that “guaranteed the tribes legal and political autonomy.”45 Although
“not always voluntary or balanced,” negotiations between the Continental
Congress and tribal nations were premised on the ideal “that the Indian nations
were pre-existing sovereign populations with legitimate, legal rights to their
lands and resources.”46
One noteworthy example arises out of the Treaty with the Delawares, the
first treaty signed by the Continental Congress.47 The treaty’s language
Where They Are Found Are Often Their Deadliest Enemies”: The Indian Side of the Story of Indian
Rights and Federalism, 38 ARIZ. L. REV. 981, 988 (1996) (“[T]hroughout the nearly two centurieslong period of their initial multicultural encounter, Indians and whites negotiated hundreds of treaties,
and engendered a set of legal traditions that today, at least according to the Indian side of the story of
Indian rights in this country, forms much of the core of our Federal Indian Law.”).
41. Pearl, supra note 18, at 300; see also Theresa R. Wilson, Nations Within a Nation: The
Evolution of Tribal Immunity, 24 AM. INDIAN L. REV. 99, 103 (1999) (noting that the subject matter
of such treaties typically centered around military concerns, as “[m]any of these treaties were military
alliances created to bolster the colonies’ strength”).
42. William C. Canby, Jr., The Status of Indian Tribes in American Law Today, 62 WASH. L. REV.
1, 2 (1987).
43. Philip P. Frickey, Marshalling Past and Present: Colonialism, Constitutionalism, and
Interpretation in Federal Indian Law, 107 HARV. L. REV. 381, 408 (1993).
44. Miller, supra note 33, at 44 (“In September 1774, the thirteen English/American colonies
created their first national government, the loosely organized Continental Congress.”).
45. Clinton, supra note 39 at 854; see also Bruce Ackerman & Neal Katyal, Our Unconventional
Founding, 62 U. CHI. L. REV. 475, 521 (1995) (“[The Confederation Congress] examined the prospect
of new Dutch loans, continued the Spanish negotiations, negotiated with the Indians, and pursued other
diplomatic issues.”).
46. Riley, History of Native American Lands, supra note 35, at 370; see also Miller, supra note
33, at 43 (“Negotiating, entering agreements, and engaging in diplomacy with other governments was
a regular practice of American Indian nations.”).
47. S. LYMAN TYLER, A HISTORY OF INDIAN POLICY 34 (1973) (“The first treaty made with
Indians by the Continental Congress was that with the Delawares in 1778.”); see also Ezra Rosser,
The Nature of Representation: The Cherokee Right to a Congressional Delegate, 15 B.U. PUB. INT.
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clearly contemplates the independent sovereign status of the Delaware
Indians. Article IV of the treaty, for instance, posits that “neither party shall
proceed to the infliction of punishments on the citizens of the other.”48 The
language of Article VI likewise implies that the tribe retained its sovereign
status, as the Article states that “the United States do engage to guarantee to
the aforesaid nation of Delawares, and their heirs, all their territorial rights in
the fullest and most ample manner, as it hath been bounded by former treaties,
as long as they said Delaware nation shall abide.”49 This Article not only
expressly acknowledges the Delaware Nation’s sovereignty, but it also
pledges to honor past treaties formulated during the colonial era. The
Continental Congress thus clearly understood the historic precedent of treatymaking between European and Indian peoples.50 The pact between the
Continental Congress and the Delaware Nation also demonstrates that
“treaties between the United States and Indian tribes are among the oldest
binding laws,” as “several even predate the federal government itself.” 51 In
the years leading up to the Constitutional Convention, the fledging states in
the post-revolutionary period adhered to the colonial practice of using treaties
to facilitate relations with Indian tribes.52 Professor Samuel Tyler has
L. J. 91, 121 (2005) (discussing the treaty in detail); Matthew L.M. Fletcher, Sovereign Comity:
Factors Recognizing Tribal Court Criminal Convictions in State and Federal Courts, 45 CT. REV. NO.
12, 1, 1 (2009) (“One of the earliest treaties executed and ratified by the United States came during
the Revolutionary War in a treaty with the Delaware Nation.”).
48. Treaty with the Delawares, U.S.–Del. Nation, Sept. 17, 1778, 7 Stat. 13, art IV (emphasis
added).
49. Id. at art. VI (emphasis added).
50. Article VI also makes clear that “it is further agreed on between the contracting parties should
it for the future be found conducive for the mutual interest of both parties to invite any other tribes
who have been friends to the interest of the United States, to join the present the present confederation,
and to form a state whereof the Delaware nation shall be the head.” Id. The implication from such
language is that until the tribe willingly agreed to join the confederation and form a state, the tribe
retained its sovereign status.
51. Philip P. Frickey, Indian Canon Originalism, 126 HARV. L. REV. 1100, 1100 n.1 (2013); see
also Kyle S. Conway, supra note 28, at 1352 (“The negotiation of federal treaties continued
throughout the confederation period, and the Northwest Ordinance of 1787, which created a
government for western territories, contained broad protections for tribes and greatly centralized
power to deal with them in the national government.”). For another example of a treaty that recognized
tribal sovereignty in the confederation era, see, Treaty with the Six Nations, U.S.–Six Nations, Oct.
22 1784, 7 Stat. 15, art. II (“The Oneida and Tuscarora nations shall be secured in the possession of
the lands on which they are settled.”).
52. Robert J. Miller, American Indian Influence on the United States Constitution and its Framers,
18 AM. INDIAN L. REV. 133, 144 (1993) (“The United States Continental and Confederation
Congresses concluded nine separate treaties with different tribes from 1778–1789.”). It should be
noted that although, as James Madison put it, the provision was largely “incomprehensible,” THE
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cogently summarized the three main historical precedents that the Framers
kept in mind while drafting the Constitution:
(1) The Indian tribes were to be thought of as separate nations and
dealt with by treaties arrived at by diplomatic relations according to
precedents established by international law. (2) As a separate
nation, the internal affairs of an Indian tribe were the responsibility
of the tribal authorities and were not supposed to be tampered with
by the United States. (3) As relations with Indian tribes were
considered to be between nations, they were to be handled by the
central government, and not by the States.53
The recognition and existence of Indian tribal sovereignty is the historic
backdrop from which the Framers drafted the Constitution. It was, in other
words, upon the antecedent historical practice, and the “experiences and the
precedents established during the colonial period,” that “the United States
would formulate her Indian policy” under the Constitution. 54 Indeed, the
language of what became the Constitution’s Supremacy Clause grandfathered

FEDERALIST NO. 42, at 284, Article IX of the Articles of Confederation granted the Confederation
Congress “the sole and exclusive right and power of . . . regulating the trade and managing all affairs
with Indians not members of any of the states; provided, that the legislative right of any state within
its own limits be not infringed or violated.” Articles of Confederation art. IX, para. 4 (emphasis
added). Some have interpreted the managing all affairs with Indians language to imply that the
Confederation Congress had close-to-plenary power over Indian tribal sovereignty. Tyler, supra note
47, at 34 (“By giving the central government power to manage affairs with ‘Indians not members of
any of the States,’ it was recognized that western Indian affairs were to be placed under Federal
control.”); see also Nell Jessup Newton, Federal Power over Indians: Its Sources, Scope, and
Limitations, 132 U. PA. L. REV. 195, 199 (1984) (noting that “the Articles of Confederation contained
a general power over Indian affairs”). The current Constitution, however, “contains no provision
allowing Congress to regulate Indian ‘affairs’ more generally.” Maggs, Gregory E., A Concise Guide
to the Articles of Confederation as a Source for Determining the Original Meaning of the Constitution,
85 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 397, 423 (2017). Indeed, in Adoptive Couple v. Baby Girl, Justice Thomas
observed that at the Constitutional Convention, James Madison had proposed giving Congress the
power to regulate “Indian affairs” but that the delegates did not adopt this proposal. 570 U.S. 637,
663–664 (2013) (Thomas, J., concurring). The refusal to include the Articles of Confederation’s broad
language led Justice Thomas to conclude that “the Framers of the Constitution were alert to the
difference between the power to regulate trade with the Indians and the power to regulate all Indian
affairs. By limiting Congress’ power to the former, the Framers declined to grant Congress the same
broad powers over Indian affairs conferred by the Articles of Confederation.” Id.
53. Tyler, supra note 47, at 32.
54. Id.; see also Robert J. Miller, supra note 52, at 144 (“Consequently, the Continental Congress,
the Confederation Congress, and the Framers of the Constitution of 1787 were accustomed to dealing
with tribes and were familiar with Indian practices and government.”).
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in treaties made even before the document’s ratification.55 The Framers’
decision to recognize the validity of treaties made before 1787 is just another
indication of the Constitution’s acknowledgement of Indian tribes’ inherent
sovereign immunity. With this historical perspective in mind, Part III exposes
the Indian plenary power doctrine as both atextual and ahistorical, ultimately
joining with others who have questioned the doctrine’s correctness as an
original matter.
III. THE DUBIOUS ORIGINAL CORRECTNESS OF THE INDIAN PLENARY
POWER DOCTRINE
From 1789 to 1871, the federal government negotiated with Indian tribes
to obtain the voluntary abrogation of tribal sovereign immunity.56 The
Supreme Court, in a sharp, historic rupture, undermined the need for such
bilateral negotiations in Lone Wolf v. Hitchcock.57 Justice Edward White
reframed this extensive history as instead an exercise of Congress’s “[p]lenary
authority over the tribal relations of the Indians, [which] has been exercised

55. The Supremacy Clause states that “[t]his Constitution, and the Laws of the United States which
shall be made in Pursuance thereof; and all Treaties made, or which shall be made, under the Authority
of the United States, shall be the supreme Law of the Land; and the Judges in every State shall be
bound thereby, any Thing in the Constitution or Laws of any State to the Contrary notwithstanding.”
U.S. CONST. art. VI, cl. 2 (emphasis added). At the Convention, Madison proposed the change from
“all treaties made” under the authority of the United States to “treaties made, or which shall be made,”
under authority of the United States. MAX FARRAND, 2 THE RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION
OF 1787, at 417 (1911) (referring to Madison’s Notes from August 25, 1787). In Madison’s words,
the “insertion was meant to obviate all doubt concerning the force of treaties preexisting, by making
the words ‘all treaties made’ to refer to them, as the words inserted would refer to future treaties.” Id.;
see also C.H. McLaughlin, The Scope of the Treaty Power in the United States, 42 MINN. L. REV. 709,
730 (1958) (“These changes show how it came about that article VI, clause 2, refers to laws made in
pursuance of the Constitution, but to treaties made or to be made under the authority of the United
States.”); id. at 731 (“With respect to treaties the retention of the phrase ‘under the authority of the
United States’ was evidently intended to include treaties made before the Constitution, a point on
which Madison’s amendment was intended merely ‘to obviate all doubt.’”).
56. Miller, supra note 33, at 46 (“Ultimately, the United States entered 366 (or more) treaties with
Indian nations from 1789–1871. These treaties were entered after extensive negotiations and
consultations and only with the consent of the tribal governments.”).
57. 187 U.S. 553, 565 (1903). I should note that United States v. Kagama, decided more than a
decade before Lone Wolf, is recognized as the first precedent that established Congress’s plenary
power to pass all manner of statutes regarding Indian tribes. Kagama, 118 U.S. 375, 379–80 (1886)
(acknowledging congressional plenary power doctrine). In that case, the Court grounded the Indian
plenary power doctrine “not so much from the clause in the Constitution . . . as from . . . the right of
exclusive sovereignty which must exist in the National Government, and can be found nowhere else.”
Id. at 380.
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by Congress from the beginning.”58 By recharacterizing Congress’s power as
plenary, the Lone Wolf Court “implied that, while the United States’
relationship with tribes developed through mutual negotiation, these
negotiations were merely an exercise of Congress’ absolute power over
tribes.”59 Congress’s inherent authority to govern Indians solely by legislation
was said to put all Indian matters “within the domain of the legislative
authority, and its action is conclusive upon the courts.”60
The consequence of Lone Wolf’s historical recharacterization—and the
doctrinal progeny which it has since spawned—is that Congress enjoys a
judicially manufactured plenary power granting “virtually unlimited authority
to regulate tribes.”61 No longer does the federal government need to take a
seat at the table and negotiate with Indian tribes to convince these sovereign
nations to willingly surrender their inherent immunity. Instead, satisfaction
of the lesser constitutional hurdle of bicameralism and presentment is today
sufficient to abrogate the immunity of Indian tribes. The introduction of the
Indian plenary power doctrine in the late nineteenth century thus transformed
the historic practice of treaty-making which hitherto bridged relations
between the United States and Indian tribes.62 With the advent of the doctrine,
tribal immunity has since become “conditional, premised on the more absolute
sovereignty of the United States.”63
Today, courts and scholars proffer a variety of justifications in defense of
58. Lone Wolf, 187 U.S. 553, 565 (1903).
59. Anna Sappington, Is Lara the Answer to Implicit Divestiture? A Critical Analysis of the
Congressional Delegation Exception, 7 WYO. L. REV. 149, 157 (2007).
60. Lone Wolf, 187 U.S. 553, 568 (1903).
61. Steele, supra note 29, at 670; see also Philip J. Prygoski, War as the Prevailing Metaphor in
Federal Indian Law Jurisprudence: An Exercise in Judicial Activism, 14 T.M. COOLEY L. REV. 491,
520 (1997) (noting that the Indian plenary power doctrine has given “Congress an absolute, unchecked
power to regulate all affairs with the Indians.”); Washington v. Confederated Tribes, 447 U.S. 134,
154 (1980) (“[T]ribal sovereignty . . . [is] subordinate to, only the Federal government, not the States”);
Corina Rocha Pandeli, When the Chips are Down: Do Indian Tribes with Insolvent Gaming
Operations Have the Ability to File for Bankruptcy Under the Federal Bankruptcy Code?, 2 UNLV
GAMING L. J. 255, 257 (2011) (“Early Supreme Court cases took the basis for Indian sovereignty
provided for in the U.S. Constitution and defined the legal parameters of such sovereignty.”).
62. See Philip M. Kannan, Reinstating Treaty-Making with Native American Tribes, 16 WM. &
MARY BILL RTS. J. 809 (2008) (examining the United States’ use of treaties to regulate affairs with
Indian tribes throughout most the of nineteenth century); Barrett, supra note 21, at 152 (“Treaty
making with the Indians ceased in 1871 in response to demands from the House of Representatives
for a role in the making of federal Indian policy. Thereafter, relations between the United States and
Indian tribes were governed by statute.”); Miller, supra note 33, at 47 (“In 1871, Congress ended treaty
making with tribes.”).
63. United States–Crow Treaty, supra note 15, at 407.
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the Indian plenary power doctrine.64 But others, Justice Thomas specifically,
have challenged the original correctness of the doctrine.65 An examination of
the Constitutional text, its original meaning, and the inadequacy of arguments
in support of the doctrine demonstrate why the Indian plenary power doctrine
has roundly, and rightly, been criticized.66
The Constitution of 1789 mentions Indians twice.67 Article I, Section 2
states that “Indians not taxed” are excluded from both congressional and tax
apportionment.68 Article I, Section 8 grants Congress the power “[t]o regulate
Commerce with foreign Nations, and among the several States, and with the
Indian tribes.”69 The Framers’ creation of a government of limited powers
extended even to “Indians, by limiting Congress’s purview [only] ‘to regulate
commerce with . . . Indian tribes.”‘70 The Indian Commerce Clause, as it is
often called, “does not confer upon Congress complete power over Indian

64. Steele, supra note 29, at 681 (discussing proffered justifications).
65. Adoptive Couple v. Baby Girl, 133 S. Ct. 2552, 2569 (2013) (Thomas, J., concurring)
(challenging the original correctness of the Indian plenary power doctrine); see also Robert N. Clinton,
There is No Federal Supremacy Clause for Indian Tribes, 34 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 113, 117 (2002)
(“[P]lenary power doctrine first emerged to rationalize late-nineteenth and early-twentieth century
efforts by Congress to assert colonial hegemony over Indian peoples in Indian country without their
consent . . . . [T]hese claims had no basis in the text, history, or theory of the United States
Constitution.”).
66. Hillary M. Hoffman, Congressional Plenary Power and Indigenous Environmental
Stewardship: The Limits of Environmental Federalism, 97 OR. L. REV. 353, 354 (2019) (“Despite the
lack of a strong constitutional foundation, over time, Congress encroached deeper into matters
affecting indigenous nations and indigenous peoples.”).
67. Conway, supra note 28, at 1351 (“The Constitution makes only a few references to Indians or
Indian tribes, so caution is necessary when attempting to locate an explicit constitutional source of
federal power over Indian affairs.”).
68. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 2, cl. 3 (emphasis added). The same provision also appears in the
Fourteenth Amendment. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 2; see also Sarah H. Cleveland, Powers
Inherent in Sovereignty: Indians, Aliens, Territories, and the Nineteenth Century Origins of Plenary
Power over Foreign Affairs, 81 TEX. L. REV. 1, 26 (2002) (“Article I and the Fourteenth Amendment
both exempt ‘Indians not taxed’ from population enumerations for congressional apportionment,
suggesting either that Indians are non-members or are separate sovereigns free from most
congressional control.”). This Article does not discuss the Apportionment Clause in depth because it
is not a source of federal power, but merely a description of how to apportion taxes and representation.
Sorenson, supra note 39, at 99 (noting that the “Indians not taxed” clause is a constitutional
acknowledgment that Native American tribes owed allegiance to a sovereign other than the United
States and its several states).
69. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 3 (emphasis added); see also Conway, supra note 28, at 1352 (“The
Indian Commerce Clause originated from the tensions between state and federal power that developed
during the confederation period.”).
70. Taylor Ledford, Foundations of Sand: Justice Thomas’s Critique of the Indian Plenary Power
Doctrine, 43 AM. INDIAN L. REV. 167, 173 (2018) (alteration in original).
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tribes,” but instead grants Congress only the power to regulate commerce with
the Indian tribes.71 To put it differently, the Indian Commerce Clause “did
not grant to Congress a police power over the Indians, nor a general power to
otherwise intervene in tribal affairs.”72 The modern Supreme Court, however,
has partly tethered Congress’s broad authority to abrogate Tribal immunity
upon the Indian Commerce Clause’s rather narrow language. 73
As a matter of basic logic, the Indian Commerce Clause cannot possibly
provide the textual hook to uphold congressional plenary lawmaking power
over Indian tribes.74 Indeed, it is well understood that Congress cannot use
the Commerce Clause power to abrogate state sovereign immunity.75 There
is no persuasive justification to treat Indian tribes differently. In fact, both
states and Indian tribes enjoy express textual mention in the Clause itself.
Defending the Indian plenary power doctrine based on the Indian Commerce
Clause, would also suggest that Congress enjoys a plenary power over all
foreign nations.76 The more natural understanding is that the Clause
“solidifies the direct relationship between Indian nations and the Federal
government and recognizes their sovereignty as derived from a source other
than the Constitution.”77 The language “with the Indian tribes” also offers a
71. Prakash, supra note 15, at 1081.
72. Robert G. Natelson, The Original Understanding of the Indian Commerce Clause, 85 DENV.
U. L. REV. 201, 265 (2007).
73. Cotton Petroleum Corp. v. New Mexico, 490 U.S. 163, 192 (1989) (noting that “the central
function of the Indian Commerce Clause is to provide Congress with plenary power to legislate in the
field of Indian affairs”); see also Montana v. Blackfeet Tribe, 471 U.S. 759, 764 (1985) (noting that
“[t]he Constitution vests . . . Federal Government with exclusive authority over relations with Indian
tribes.”); Miller, supra note 52, at 154 (“The new Constitution and this clause made it clear that the
federal government would regulate Indian affairs.”).
74. Richard A. Monette, A New Federalism for Indian Tribes: The Relationship Between the
United States and Tribes in Light of Our Federalism and Republican Democracy, 25 U. TOL. L. REV.
617, 640 (1994) (“[T]he ‘Indian Commerce Clause’ alone is not a source of Union power over the
tribes. Such Union power requires the Treaty Clause and a treaty upon which to hang an intersovereign relationship.”).
75. Seminole Tribe v. Florida, 517 U.S. 44 (1996) (holding that Congress cannot, when acting
pursuant to its legislative powers under Article I of the Constitution, abrogate the states’ Eleventh
Amendment sovereign immunity); accord City of Boerne v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507 (1997) (placing
limits on Congress’s power to abrogate a states’ sovereign immunity under Section 5 of the Fourteenth
Amendment).
76. Prakash, supra note 15, at 1087–88.
77. Hoover, supra note 8, at 272–73. In his concurrence in United State v. Lara, Justice Thomas
expressed his disbelief over attempts to rest the Indian plenary power doctrine on the Indian Commerce
Clause. 541 U.S. 193 (2004) (Thomas, J., concurring). In his view, the “Federal Government cannot
simultaneously claim power to regulate virtually every aspect of the tribes through ordinary domestic
legislation and also maintain that the tribes possess anything resembling ‘sovereignty.’” Id. at 225

16

[Vol. 2020: 1]

“Magic Words” and Original Understanding
PEPPERDINE LAW REVIEW

persuasive clue that the Framers understood the tribes as neither subordinate
nor conquered peoples.78 The text indicates that Framers recognized the
Indian tribes as distinct entities.79 Just as Congress does not “hide elephants
in mouseholes,”80 neither did the Framers conceal broad grants of plenary
power in specific grants of particularized authority.81 According to Professor
Robert S. Clinton, Indian tribes “inclusion in the Commerce Clause with two
other sovereigns, foreign nations and the states, whose political existence the
United States also had no power to destroy, reflects that conception of the
power.”82
The other textual source that recognizes the federal government’s
relationship with tribes is the Treaty Clause, “which indisputably includes the
power to enter into treaties with tribes even though it does not mention them
specifically.”83 Article II, Section 2, Clause 2 vests the President—
importantly not Congress—with the “Power, by and with the Advice and
Consent of the Senate, to make Treaties.”84 Only the President can exercise
the treaty power with sovereign entities. The Senate simply either rejects or
ratifies the agreed upon treaty.85
The Treaty Power, like the Indian Commerce Clause, seems an imprudent

(citation omitted). He also believed that the original understanding of the Clause cut against Congress’
claim to plenary power over Indian Tribes. Id. at 229–31.
78. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 3
79. Krakoff, supra note 2, at 529.
80. Whitman v. Am. Trucking Ass’ns, 531 U.S. 457, 468 (2001).
81. Hoffman, supra note 66, at 378 (noting that “the plain text of the Indian Commerce Clause—
which is the most cited constitutional basis for congressional plenary power—does not support
legislative efforts in matters affecting indigenous nations, their members, and their lands”).
82. Clinton, supra note 65, at 147.
83. Krakoff, supra note 2, at 529; see also id. at 497 n.24 (“The Treaty Clause does not mention
Indian tribes specifically, but there is no dispute that the power includes treatymaking with tribes.”);
Agua Caliente Band of Cahuilla Indians v. Superior Court, 40 Cal. 4th 239, 249 (2006) (citation
omitted) (“The treaty clause of the federal Constitution has been recognized in some cases as another
potential source of plenary federal authority over Indian tribes.”); Sorenson, supra note 39, at 98
(positing that “the notion that the United States should deal with tribes as sovereign entities and respect
their sovereign powers was nevertheless written into American law from its founding”).
84. U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2, cl. 2; It is worth mentioning that Article I Section 10 Clause 1 forbids
states from “enter[ing] into any Treaty.” U.S. CONST. art. I, § 10, cl. 1. The power is thus vested in
the federal government—and more specifically, the President alone.
85. Justice Thomas recently stressed this point, arguing that because Article II vests authority in
the President to make treaties it thereby largely excises Congress from participation. See United States
v. Lara, 541 U.S. 193 (2004) (Thomas, J., concurring). He also rebuked the majority in that case for
holding that the treaty power granted Congress a “free-floating power to legislate as it sees fit on topics
that could potentially implicate some unspecified treaty.” Id. at 225.
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textual foundation on which to rest Congress’s purported plenary authority to
abrogate tribal immunity. The Treaty Power authorizes the President alone to
negotiate bilateral and multilateral treaties with willing Indian tribes.86 The
treaty mechanism thus appears directed toward protecting “tribes from
arbitrary assumption of federal power, for a tribe had to agree to a treaty.” 87
As the Supreme Court has even noted, the “treaty power does not literally
authorize Congress to act legislatively, for it is an Article II power authorizing
the President, not Congress, ‘to make Treaties.’”88 Seen in this light, the
Treaty Clause taken together with the Indian Commerce Clause, “provide two
constitutional bases for sovereign-to-sovereign relations between the United
States and Indian nations.”89 They both undercut—rather than support—the
Indian plenary power doctrine.
The Constitution, as both of these clauses show, clearly contemplates the
federal government dealing with the various Indian nations “on a tribe-bytribe basis.”90 Viewed with the extensive history of treatymaking between
European and Indian peoples in mind, it is clear that “treaties presumed that
Native American tribes were independent and sovereign; being independent
and sovereign, the Constitution could not confer upon the national

86. Throughout the republic’s first century, the President freely wielded the treaty power to
negotiate with Indian tribes. See Hoffman, supra note 66, at 362 (“During the first 100 years of United
States history, if the federal government sought to remove a tribe or otherwise regulate an internal
tribal matter, this was generally accomplished using the Treaty Power and left to the executive branch
to negotiate.”); see also Pearl, supra note 18, at 300 (“Treaty making continued well into the midnineteenth century until Congress passed the Indian Appropriations Act in 1871, which prohibited the
President from negotiating treaties and agreements with Indian tribes.”). Congress certainly possesses
the power to pass treaty implementing legislation with tribes and to regulate American citizens and
their ability to engage in trade with the tribes. Originally understood, however, congressional authority
did not extend to matters internal to the tribes.
87. Natelson, supra note 72, at 266; see also Mark R. Carter, Congress’ Encroachment on the
President’s Power in Indian Law and its Effect on Executive-Order Reservations, 11 SEATTLE J. SOC.
JUST. 1193, 1204 (2013) (discussing some of the earliest treaties President Washington entered into
with Indian tribes).
88. Lara, 541 U.S. at 201 (2004) (quoting U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2, cl. 2).
89. Riley, Native Nations, supra note 35, at 179; see also Judith Resnik, Dependent Sovereigns:
Indian Tribes, States, and the Federal Courts, 56 U. CHI. L. REV. 671, 691 (1989) (noting that based
on the Constitution’s text, “Indian tribes are treated as entities with whom to have commerce and to
make treaties”). Justice Thomas’s original understanding of the Constitution supports the conclusion
that “neither the Treaty Clause nor the Indian Commerce Clause empowers Congress to decide Indian
tribal sovereignty’s scope.” Carter, supra note 87, at 1197.
90. Ledford, supra note 70, at 202; see also Seielstad, supra note 27, at 685 (noting that in the
Republic’s early years, “[h]undreds of treaties were entered into with tribes by the United States
government”).
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government any domestic power over them.”91 Even though the textual and
logical arguments to the contrary seem insurmountable, “the Supreme Court
has held that Treaty Clause authority, combined with authority in the Indian
Commerce Clause, gives Congress ‘plenary and exclusive’ powers to legislate
‘in respect to Indian tribes.’”92
Analysis of the Framers’ deliberations during the Convention also reveals
that the original understanding of congressional power over Indian tribes was
limited to the document’s enumerated powers.93 The Framers hotly debated
the scope of congressional power in the area of tribal sovereignty leading up
to and during the Constitutional Convention.94 Professor Gregory Ablavsky’s
recent article captures the Madisonian and the Hamiltonian perspectives on
Indian peoples. Although the two perspectives maintained a fair share of
differences, both recognized the inherent sovereignty of Indian tribes. 95 At
the Constitutional Convention, moreover, it was Madison who “proposed the
Constitution’s less ambiguous Indian Commerce Clause to grant power to the
federal government to negotiate with tribes.”96 His proposal withstood other
delegates’ preference for inclusion of “exclusive congressional jurisdiction
over all Indian affairs.”97 The Convention’s rejection of such an exclusive
power implies that the Framers did not wish to grant Congress plenary power
to abrogate Tribal sovereignty. The Framers instead “deliberately took a
91. Mark Savage, Native Americans and the Constitution: The Original Understanding, 16 AM.
INDIAN L. REV. 57, 113 (1991); see also Pearl, supra note 18, at 300 (noting that in the early years of
the Republic, “[t]reaties were the primary mechanism by which the national government dealt with
Indian tribes.”); Hall, supra note 5, at 499 (explaining that the treaty power “was the chief means for
dealing with the Indians in the early years”). The general view of tribal sovereignty is captured by
one episode in which Secretary Henry Knox reported to President Washington that “[t]he Indians
being the prior occupants, possess the right of the soil. It cannot be taken from them unless by their
free consent, or by the right of conquest in case of a just war. To dispossess them on any other principle
would be a gross violation of the fundamental laws of nature and of that distributive justice which is
the glory of a nation.” GEORGE DEWEY HARMON, SIXTY YEARS OF INDIAN AFFAIRS 55 (1941).
92. Hoffman, supra note 66, at 359.
93. Savage, supra note 91, at 72–78 (observing that the Framers neither discussed a congressional
plenary power over Indian tribes nor suggested that the War, Property, or Treaty clauses granted such
a power).
94. Hoffman, supra note 66, at 359.
95. See generally Gregory Ablavsky, The Savage Constitution, 63 DUKE L. J. 999 (2014)
(discussing the competing perspectives while also acknowledging that both views recognized the
inherent sovereign immunity of Indian tribes); see also Miller, supra note 52, at 135 (“Many Framers
were familiar with Indian culture through serving as Indian commissioners for their states or the
Continental Congress, and as Indian treaty negotiators.”).
96. Carter, supra note 87, at 1204 (emphasis added).
97. Natelson, supra note 72, at 228 (emphasis added).
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general police power out of the Constitution and chose instead to limit
Congress’s authority to” regulate commerce with the tribes.98
Further, historian Mark Savage’s thorough examination of the Framers’
original understanding of Indian tribes led him to conclude that the Framers
did not envision the federal government acting as a “sovereign over Native
Americans.”99 As Indian tribes played a central role throughout the eighteenth
century, they were far from a political afterthought during the Constitutional
Convention.100 Indeed, while the Constitution was being drafted, “powerful
Native nations owned and governed much of the territory mapmakers labeled
‘United States.’”101 The vast territorial presence of the Indian tribes,
combined with the Constitution’s “scant reference elsewhere to federal
authority related to, much less over tribes,” shows that the Framers
contemplated Indian tribes and the United States interacting as separate
sovereigns with one another.102
Professor Robert Clinton’s research likewise reveals that “the Framers
generally accepted the notion that the Indian tribes constituted separate,
sovereign peoples who were totally self-governing within their territory and
who relied on the federal government solely for external relations, i.e.,
diplomatic representation with foreign governments and protection from
foreign foes and citizens of the United States.”103
Comprehensive
congressional power over indigenous peoples is simply not what the Framers
envisioned.104 Instead, the Framers “regarded Indians as distinct nations to be
dealt with diplomatically and at arm’s length.”105
98. Hoffman, supra note 66, at 379 (emphasis in original); see also FRANCIS JENNINGS, EMPIRE
FORTUNE 88 (1988) (noting that Benjamin Franklin wrote that “[s]ecuring the Friendship of the
Indians is of the greatest Consequence to these Colonies”).
99. Savage, supra note 91, at 88 n.124; see also THE FEDERALIST NO. 25, at 163 (Alexander
Hamilton) (“The territories of Britain, Spain, and of the Indian nations in our neighborhood . . . encircle
the Union from Maine to Georgia.”).
100. See generally Savage, supra note 91 (explaining the central role of Indian tribes throughout
the era).
101. Ablavsky, supra note 95, at 1003–04.
102. Hoffman, supra note 66, at 359 (emphasis in original).
103. Clinton, supra note 65, at 147; see also Newton, supra note 52, at 200 (“The absence of a
general power over Indian affairs in the Constitution is not surprising to students of history, for at the
time the Constitution was drafted, the framers regarded Indian tribes as sovereign nations.”).
104. Hoffman, supra note 66, at 358.
105. Prakash, supra note 15, at 1080 (“Although Congress might be able to regulate commerce with
the tribes on a unilateral basis (in the same way it could regulate commerce with other nations on a
unilateral basis), diplomacy—principally treaties—generally would regulate the relationship. None
of the Founders envisioned that the federal government—a government of enumerated powers—
OF
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Indian tribes were also not participants at either the Constitutional
Convention or the ratifying debates. The Framers “did not invite American
Indian nations (or tribes) to the Constitutional Convention, nor did they ask
Indian nations to ratify the Constitution.”106 Indian tribes “played no role in
selecting or designing the governance structure of the United States.”107 The
Indian plenary power doctrine thus grants Congress the authority to abrogate
the immunity of separate sovereigns despite their lack of involvement in either
the drafting or the ratification of the Constitution. The Court has recognized
that “it would be absurd to suggest that the tribes surrendered immunity in a
convention to which they were not even parties.”108
The generation that framed and ratified the Constitution, and that
generation’s immediate successors, widely understood that tribes enjoyed
sovereign immunity subject to abrogation by voluntary treaties alone. Indeed,
for the United States’ first century of existence, the relationship between
Indian tribes and the federal government was premised on negotiated treaties,
rather than any superseding federal power over the sovereignty of the tribes.109
The evidence from the Founding era is hard to square with the modern Indian
plenary power doctrine. The original and plain meaning of the Constitution’s
text, moreover, indicates that “the national legislative power is limited to
commerce with Native American tribes, and extends no farther.” 110
Congressional plenary power over the sovereign immunity of indigenous
tribal nations is thus “a house of cards ultimately built upon a constitutionallyflawed thesis.”111

would enjoy a plenary power over all aspects of tribal life.”).
106. Matthew L.M. Fletcher, Tribal Consent, 8 STAN. J. C.R. & C.L. 45, 76 (2012); see also
Sorenson, supra note 39, at 98 (“Absent, of course, from the Constitutional Convention, were
representatives of tribes.”).
107. Hoffman, supra note 66, at 381 (“Congress’s exercise of expansive authority over indigenous
nations does not adhere to the fundamental democratic principle that citizen participants validate
governmental actions through consent.”).
108. Blatchford v. Native Village of Noatak, 501 U.S. 775, 782 (1991); see also Hoffman, supra
note 66, at 383 (“The Constitution should not govern peoples who did not take part in its development
or adoption.”).
109. Clinton, supra note 65, at 145; see also GORDON S. WOOD, EMPIRE OF LIBERTY: A HISTORY
OF THE EARLY REPUBLIC, 1789-1815, at 123–32 (2009) (“Nothing preoccupied the Federalist
[Washington] administration more than having to deal with . . . native peoples.”).
110. Savage, supra note 91, at 79; see also Miller, supra note 33, at 40 (“The political existence of
the American Indian nations and their government-to-government relationship with the United States
is expressly recognized in the U.S. Constitution.”).
111. Clinton, supra note 65, at 117.
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IV. DOES “DOMESTIC GOVERNMENT” COVER INDIAN TRIBES?
To fully understand the current circuit split on the question whether the
term “domestic government” found in Section 106 of the Bankruptcy Code
unequivocally covers Indian tribes, it is important to situate the term in its
statutory context. Under Section 106, a federal bankruptcy court may “hear
and determine any issue arising with respect to the application of [the Code]
. . . to governmental units.”112 Should the bankruptcy court determine that the
governmental unit is liable, the court may enter “an order, process, or
judgment,” which includes “an order or judgment awarding a money
recovery,” against that unit.113 The court may also enforce “any such order,
process, or judgment against any governmental unit.”114
The term
“governmental unit,” as previously mentioned, is defined to include “domestic
government.”115 With the statutory context in mind, this Part examines the
split over whether “domestic government” should be interpreted to abrogate
the immunity of sovereign Indian tribes.
The Ninth Circuit, representing one side of the split, reasoned that the
plain and ordinary meaning of the Bankruptcy Code’s abrogating provision
clearly covers Indian tribes because they are “domestic government[s],” and,
as a result, “Congress ‘unequivocally expressed’ its intent to abrogate Indian
tribes’ immunity.”116 Prior to reaching that conclusion, the Ninth Circuit
made sure to explain that tribal “[i]mmunity from suit has been recognized by
the courts of this country as integral to the sovereignty and self-governance of
Indian tribes.”117 Looking at the text of the Code, however, the court
determined that it was “clear from the face of §§ 106(a) and 101(27) that
Congress did intend to abrogate the sovereign immunity of all ’foreign and
domestic governments.’”118
112. 11 U.S.C. § 106(a)(2) (2012).
113. Id. at § 106(a)(3).
114. Id. at § 106(a)(4).
115. Id. at § 101(27).
116. Krystal Energy Co. v. Navajo Nation, 357 F.3d 1055, 1060 (9th Cir. 2004); see also In re
Platinum Oil Properties, LLC, 465 B.R. 621, 643 (Bankr. D.N.M. 2011) (holding that domestic
government “embodies Congress’ clear, and unequivocal abrogation of tribal sovereign immunity”);
Russell v. Fort McDowell Yavapai Nation (In re Russell), 293 B.R. 34, 44 (Bankr. D.Ariz.2003)
(holding that “[t]he term ‘other foreign or domestic government’ in § 101(27) unequivocally, and
without implication, includes Indian tribes as ‘governmental units.”); Pandeli, supra note 61, at 273
(discussing the Ninth Circuit’s decision).
117. Krystal Energy Co., 357 F.3d at 1056.
118. Id. at 1057 (emphasis added).
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Analogizing to state sovereign immunity, the court also pointed out that
“Congress clearly does not have to list all of the specific states, beginning with
Alabama and ending with Wyoming.”119 Congress can instead abrogate the
immunity of “all states” in one-fell swoop.120 By using the phrase “other
foreign or domestic governments,” Congress thus “effected a generic
abrogation of sovereign immunity” that swept in all Indian tribes.121 Setting
aside the argument that the general proscription against abrogation by
implication requires Congress to specifically list each government, the court
noted that Congress need not list each tribe by name.
In addition to its textual rationale, the Ninth Circuit also concluded that
domestic government “logically” must cover Indian tribes.122 Not only did
the ordinary meaning of domestic government suggest the term was “allencompassing,”123 but application of a simple syllogism in the court’s view
displaced any lingering doubt. The court reasoned as follows: “Congress
explicitly abrogated the immunity of any ’foreign or domestic government.’
Indian tribes are domestic governments. Therefore, Congress expressly
abrogated the immunity of Indian tribes.”124 The combined logic of the
syllogism and the common, ordinary meaning of domestic government, led
the court to hold that “[n]o implication beyond the words of the statute is
necessary to conclude that Congress ‘unequivocally expressed’ its intent to
abrogate Indian tribes’ immunity.”125 Yet the court went a step further,
asserting that Congress need not to “utter the magic words ‘Indian tribes’
when abrogating tribal sovereign immunity.”126
119. Id. at 1059.
120. Id.
121. Id. But see Greggory W. Dalton, Comment, A Failure of Expression: How the Provisions of
the U.S. Bankruptcy Code Fail to Abrogate Tribal Sovereign Immunity, 81 WASH. L. REV. 645, 647
(2006) (suggesting that phrases like “other foreign or domestic governments” historically have been
deemed insufficient to abrogate tribal sovereign immunity).
122. Id. at 1057.
123. Id. at 1059.
124. Id. at 1058; see also In re Russell, 293 B.R. 34, 41 (Bankr. D. Ariz. 2003) (applying the notable
syllogism of the “classic form—All men are mortal; Socrates is a man; hence Socrates is mortal—” to
conclude that domestic government logically must cover Indian tribes).
125. Id. at 1060.
126. Id. at 1061 (emphasis added). Summarizing other justifications for the Ninth Circuit’s holding,
the Delaware bankruptcy court stated that the “the Ninth Circuit reasoned that: (i) the Supreme Court
has referred to Indian tribes as ‘domestic dependent nations;’ (ii) Congress enacted sections 106 and
101(27) with that reference in mind; (iii) Congress abrogated sovereign immunity as to states, foreign
states, and other foreign or domestic governments; and, therefore (iv) Congress must have intended to
include Indian tribes as “other foreign or domestic governments.” In re Money Ctr. of Am., Inc., 565
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In contrast to the Ninth Circuit’s approach, a divided panel of the Sixth
Circuit recently held that Congress did not unequivocally abrogate tribal
immunity by using the term “domestic government.”127 The majority began
its analysis by reiterating that under the Supreme Court’s current doctrine,
Congress must unequivocally express its intent to abrogate the sovereign
immunity of Indian tribes in explicit legislation.128 The panel next described
“unequivocal” as establishing a high bar—”‘[t]he term ‘unequivocal,’ taken
by itself,’ means ‘admits no doubt.”‘129 That high bar, especially in the
sensitive context of tribal sovereign immunity, supported a literal reading of
unequivocal—requiring that for a statute “to abrogate tribal sovereign
immunity, Congress must leave no doubt about its intent.”130 The majority
nevertheless conceded that “[t]here cannot be reasonable debate that Indian
tribes are both ‘domestic’ . . . and also that Indian tribes are fairly
characterized as possessing attributes of a ‘government.’”131 The majority’s
concession recognizes the logical force of the Ninth Circuit’s syllogism.
According to the Sixth Circuit, however, the “real question is whether
Congress—when it employed the phrase ‘other foreign or domestic
government’—unequivocally expressed an intent to abrogate tribal sovereign
immunity.”132 The supposition that Indian tribes qualify as “domestic
governments does not lead to the conclusion that Congress unequivocally
meant to include them when it employed the phrase ‘other foreign or domestic
B.R. 87, 102 (Bankr. D. Del. 2017). Other courts have also considered the issue and joined the Ninth
Circuit’s side of the split. See In re Platinum Oil Props., LLC, 465 B.R. 621, 643 (Bankr. D.N.M.
2011) (“11 U.S.C. § 106 together with 11 U.S.C. § 101(27) embodies Congress’ clear and unequivocal
abrogation of tribal sovereign immunity.”); In re Russell, 293 B.R. 34, 44 (Bankr. D. Ariz. 2003)
(“‘[O]ther foreign or domestic government’ in § 101(27) unequivocally, and without implication,
includes Indian tribes as ‘governmental units.’”); In re Vianese, 195 B.R. 572, 576 (Bankr. N.D.N.Y.
1995) (tribes “comprise ‘governmental units’ within the meaning of Code § 101(27)”).
127. In re Greektown Holdings, LLC, 917 F.3d 451 (6th Cir. 2019). The district court below
concluded that that it could not “say ‘with perfect confidence’ that Congress intended, by using the
generic phrase ‘other domestic governments’ in § 101(27), to clearly, unequivocally, unmistakably
and without ambiguity abrogate tribal sovereign immunity in § 106(a).” In re Greektown Holdings,
LLC, 532 B.R. 680, 684 (E.D. Mich. 2015), aff’d, 917 F.3d 451 (6th Cir. 2019).
128. Santa Clara Pueblo v. Martinez, 436 U.S. 49, 59 (1978).
129. In re Greektown Holdings, LLC, 917 F.3d 451, 457 (6th Cir. 2019) (quoting Addington v.
Texas, 441 U.S. 418, 432 (1979) (citing WEBSTER’S THIRD NEW INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY
(1961)); see also In re Russell, 293 B.R. 34, 38 (Bankr. D. Ariz. 2003) (“So according to the ‘plain
meaning’ of ‘unequivocal,’ to be equivocal the statute purporting to abrogate sovereign immunity must
be susceptible of an alternative interpretation that does not do so.”).
130. Id. at 457 (emphasis in original).
131. Id. at 459 (alteration in original).
132. Id.
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government.’”133 The court was in search of greater specificity.
The majority relied on Congress’s consistent historical practice of stating
Indian tribes by name to abrogate their immunity.134 Instead of abrogating
tribal immunity through reference to “governmental units,” which is defined
to include a “domestic government,” the court posited that Congress could
have just followed past practice and explicitly mentioned Indian tribes. 135 The
majority granted significant weight to the fact that “there is not one example
in all of history where the Supreme Court has found that Congress intended
to abrogate tribal sovereign immunity without expressly mentioning Indian
tribes somewhere in the statute.”136 As “it is undisputed that no provision of
the Bankruptcy Code mentions Indian tribes,” the court reasoned that it made
historical sense to interpret domestic government not to abrogate tribal
immunity as well.137 Pursuant to the expressio unius canon, the majority also
asserted that Congress’s failure to explicitly mention Indian tribes, “after
arguably mentioning every other sovereign by its specific name,” provided
circumstantial evidence that Congress meant to exclude tribes from the
statute’s coverage.138
133. Id. at 460 (citation omitted).
134. Id. at 459 (citation omitted).
135. Id.
136. Id. at 460 (citations omitted). The court also reasoned that in the years immediately preceding
Congress’s enactment of the Bankruptcy Code, several statutes included Indian tribes by name. See
Resource Conservation and Recovery Act of 1976, 42 U.S.C. §§ 6972(a)(1)(A), 6903(13), 6903(15)
(authorizing suits against an “Indian tribe”); Safe Water Drinking Act of 1974, 42 U.S.C. §§ 300j9(i)(2)(A), 300f(10), 300f(12) (authorizing suits against an “Indian tribe”).
137. In re Greektown Holdings, LLC, 917 F.3d at 461.
138. Id. at 462. The graveness of determining the limits on tribal immunity also cautioned the
majority to tread carefully when deciding whether Congress unequivocally expressed its intent to
abrogate tribal sovereign immunity. Id.; see also Santa Clara Pueblo v. Martinez, 436 U.S. 49, 60
(1978) (“[A] proper respect both for tribal sovereignty itself and for the plenary authority of Congress
in this area cautions that we tread lightly in the absence of clear indications of legislative intent.”).
Joining the Sixth Circuit’s side of the split include: Sawczuk v. Thunderbird Entm’t Ctr., Inc. (In re
Money Ctrs. of Am., Inc.), Civ. No. 17-319-RGA, No. AP 16-50410-CSS, 2018 WL 1535464, at *4
(D. Del. Mar. 29, 2018) (“Section 101(27)’s reference to ‘other . . . domestic government[s]’ falls
short of the clarity required for abrogation of tribal sovereign immunity.”) (alterations in original); see
also id. at *3 (“Where the language of a federal statute does not include ‘Indian tribes’ in definitions
of parties subject to suit or does not specifically assert jurisdiction over ‘Indian tribes,’ courts find the
statute insufficient to express an unequivocal congressional abrogation of tribal sovereign immunity.”
(citation omitted)); In re Whitaker, 474 B.R. 687, 695 (B.A.P. 8th Cir. 2012) (“[I]n enacting § 106,
Congress did not unequivocally express its intent by enacting legislation explicitly abrogating the
sovereign immunity of tribes.”); In re Star Grp. Commc’ns, Inc., 568 B.R. 616, 622-25 (Bankr. D.N.J.
2016) (following Whitaker); In re National Cattle Cong., 247 B.R. 259, 267 (Bankr. N.D. Iowa 2000)
(“The Code makes no specific mention of Indian tribes.”); In re Mayes, 294 B.R. 145, 148 n.10 (B.A.P.
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Even though the majority was unwilling to interpret “domestic
government” as evincing sufficient congressional intent to abrogate tribal
immunity, the court made sure to note that “Congress need not use ‘magic
words’ to abrogate tribal sovereign immunity.”139 Instead, Congress need
only “unequivocally express” that purpose, which it can do in certain
circumstances without express mention of Indian tribes or a closely associated
term.140 In a footnote, the majority suggested that “a statute stating that
‘sovereign immunity is abrogated as to all parties who could otherwise claim
sovereign immunity,’” might be sufficient to evince congressional intent to
abrogate tribal immunity.141 The majority, therefore, did not “hold that
specific reference to Indian tribes is in all instances required to abrogate tribal
sovereign immunity.”142
The dissent’s rationale in many ways echoed the Ninth Circuit’s
reasoning. After applying the traditional tools of statutory interpretation to
the plain meaning of the language, the dissent concluded there existed
sufficient evidence of congressional intent to “abrogate[] the sovereign
immunity of any government, of any type, anywhere in the world.”143 What
is more, the dissent reasoned that logic recognized that Indian tribes are both
domestic—as they reside and exercise sovereign authority within the
10th Cir. 2003) (noting that the inference that the term included Indian tribes as domestic dependent
nations did not meet the requirement for abrogation of tribal sovereignty to be explicit).
139. In re Greektown Holdings, LLC, 917 F.3d 451, 461 (6th Cir. 2019) (emphasis added).
140. Id.
141. Id. at 461 n.10 (quoting Krystal Energy Co. v. Navajo Nation, 357 F.3d 1055, 1058 (9th Cir.
2004)).
142. In re Greektown Holdings, LLC, 917 F.3d 451, 461 (6th Cir. 2019). Some courts have
indicated that specific reference to Indian tribes may be a prerequisite before finding the statute
abrogates a tribe’s sovereign immunity. See In re Star Grp. Commc’ns, Inc., 568 B.R. 616, 625
(Bankr. D.N.J. 2016) (“If Congress had intended to abrogate sovereign immunity to Indian tribes under
section 106, it could easily and expressly have done so, but it did not.”); In re Nat’l Cattle Cong., 247
B.R. 259, 267 (Bankr. N.D. Iowa 2000) (“The Code makes no specific mention of Indian tribes.
Unlike States and foreign governments, Indian tribes are not specifically included in the § 101(27)
definition of ‘governmental unit.’ In order to conclude Congress intended to subject Indian tribes to
suit under the Code, the Court would need to infer such intent from language which does not
unequivocally and unambiguously apply to Indian tribes. Considering the Supreme Court’s
pronouncements on tribal sovereign immunity, such an inference is inappropriate.”); Confederated
Tribe of Colville Reservation Tribal Credit v. White (In re White), No. 96–CS–247, 1996 WL
33407856, at *3 (E.D. Wash. 1996) (“There is no express mention of Indian tribes anywhere in the
Bankruptcy Code, and the Court could only infer that an Indian tribe is a ‘domestic government’ under
the definition of governmental unit. For these reasons, the Court concludes that Congress has not
unequivocally expressed clear legislative intent to abrogate tribal sovereign immunity pursuant to the
Bankruptcy Code.”).
143. In re Greektown Holdings, LLC, 917 F.3d at 467 (Zouhary, J. dissenting).

26

[Vol. 2020: 1]

“Magic Words” and Original Understanding
PEPPERDINE LAW REVIEW

territorial borders of the United States—and constitute a form of
government—as they exercise political authority over and on behalf of tribal
members.144 This reasoning coupled with “clear textual evidence of
congressional intent,” was, like the Ninth Circuit had done, translated into a
“simple syllogism: Sovereign immunity is abrogated as to all governments.
Indian tribes are governments. Hence sovereign immunity is abrogated as to
Indian tribes.”145
Also undergirding the dissent’s analysis was Supreme Court precedent
cautioning against a requirement that congressional intent be stated in a
“particular way” using specific “magic words.”146 The dissent thus took aim
at the majority’s conclusion, equating it to a magic word requirement. In the
dissent’s view, the task is “not to hold Congress to a standard of speaking as
precisely as it possibly can or to demand that it use the same words today as
it has in the past,” but instead Congress’s language need just clearly subject
the sovereign to suit to abrogate the tribe’s immunity.147 The fact that the
plain and logical meaning of domestic government covers Indian tribes was
sufficient for the dissent to conclude that Congress unequivocally evinced an
intent to abrogate tribal sovereign immunity.
As a matter of pure statutory interpretation, wholly removed from the
Indian tribal context, the Ninth Circuit majority and the Sixth Circuit’s
dissenting judge appear to have the better of the two arguments. 148 The
Bankruptcy Code plainly “abrogate[s]” the “sovereign immunity” of a
“governmental unit.”149 The Code defines a “governmental unit” to include a
“domestic government.”150 Both the Sixth and the Ninth Circuits agree that
the Indian tribes unquestionably qualify as governments, and domestic ones
to boot.151 Based on the simple reasoning that (1) Congress abrogated (2) the
144. Id.
145. Id. at 468.
146. FAA v. Cooper, 566 U.S. 284, 291 (2012) (emphasis added).
147. In re Greektown Holdings, LLC, 917 F.3d at 470 (Zouhary, J. dissenting).
148. See Bevilacqua, supra note 2, at II.–171 (noting that “the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals’ logic
that Indian tribes could fit within the definition of ‘governmental units’ under the Bankruptcy Code is
reasonable.”).
149. 11 U.S.C. § 106(a) (2012).
150. Id. at § 101(27).
151. Indian tribes fit that definition because they “exercise ‘inherent sovereign authority’” on behalf
of their members. Michigan v. Bay Mills Indian Cmty., 572 U.S. 782, 788 (2014) (quoting Okla. Tax
Comm’n v. Citizen Band Potawatomi Indian Tribe of Okla., 498 U.S. 505, 509 (1991)). Likewise, as
previously mentioned, the Ninth Circuit explained that “logically, there is no other form of government
outside the foreign/domestic dichotomy.” Krystal Energy Co. v. Navajo Nation, 357 F.3d 1055, 1057
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sovereign immunity of domestic governments (3) which commonsensically
must include Indian tribes, it seems clear that Congress intended to abrogate
the Indian tribes’ sovereign immunity. Under current doctrine, congressional
intent to abrogate tribal sovereign immunity need only “be clearly discernable
from the statutory text in light of traditional interpretive tools.”152
Interpreting domestic government to not cover Indian tribes would also
violate a cardinal rule of statutory interpretation: a statutory provision should
not be construed “to have no consequence.”153 As the term “domestic
government” cannot plausibly be read to include a governmental unit already
listed in Section 101(27), interpreting “domestic government” to exclude
Indian tribes would render the statutory term superfluous. 154 Although
“domestic government” is a broad term, the Supreme Court has made clear
that “[b]road general language is not necessarily ambiguous when
congressional objectives require broad terms.”155 “Domestic government” is
thus not necessarily ambiguous. Indeed, given the far-reaching scope of the
Bankruptcy Code, the term “domestic government” is not ambiguous; it is
simply a broad category. The application of basic first-principles of statutory
interpretation demonstrates that the Sixth Circuit likely failed to properly
interpret the term “domestic government” to cover Indian tribes.
Despite the persuasive statutory arguments in favor of interpreting
domestic government to cover Indian tribes, this Article contends that the
(9th Cir. 2004); see also Blatchford v. Native Village of Noatak, 501 U.S. 775, 782 (1991) (“in some
respects,” tribes “are more like States than foreign sovereigns . . . [t]hey are, for example, domestic”).
152. FAA v. Cooper, 566 U.S. 284, 291 (2012). If the term domestic government is considered
ambiguous, the Indian canon would trigger, and the term would be construed in favor of the Indian
tribes. See Wildenthal, supra note 5, at 102 (noting that courts are to “construe treaties, statutes, and
other sources of law liberally in favor of Indians, so as to resolve any ambiguities or uncertainties in
their favor (the ‘ambiguity canon’).”); see also County of Yakima v. Confederated Tribes & Bands of
the Yakima Indian Nation, 502 U.S. 251, 269 (1992) (Scalia, J.) (quoting Montana v. Blackfeet Tribe,
471 U.S. 759, 766 (1985) (“When we are faced with . . . two possible constructions, our choice between
them must be dictated by a principle deeply rooted in this Court’s Indian jurisprudence: ‘[S]tatutes are
to be construed liberally in favor of the Indians, with ambiguous provisions interpreted to their
benefit.”’); Hall, supra note 5, at 520 (noting that Choate v. Trapp, 224 US 665 was “the first case to
formally extend the Indian law canons to the interpretations of statutes”). The main purpose of the
Indian canon is to ensure “that Congress does not lightly or inadvertently terminate the sovereign
rights of Indians.” Hall, supra note 5, at 542. Even though neither the Sixth Circuit nor Ninth Circuit
discussed the Indian canon of construction in much detail, I am persuaded that the canon should not
apply in this situation because as a matter of both logic and statutory context domestic government is
not an ambiguous term.
153. Nielsen v. Preap, 139 S. Ct. 954, 969 (2019) (internal citation omitted).
154. See 11 U.S.C. § 101(27).
155. Diamond v. Chakrabarty, 447 U.S. 303, 315 (1980).
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dubious original correctness of the Indian plenary power doctrine should
trump the Ninth Circuit and the Sixth Circuit dissent’s compelling statutory
justifications.156 Part V explains why a magic words clear statement rule
should govern the question whether a statute has abrogated tribunal sovereign
immunity.
V. DOUBTFUL PLENARY POWER AUTHORITY WARRANTS A MAGIC WORDS
CLEAR STATEMENT RULE
The purpose of clear statement rules is for courts to “treat all statutes as
maintaining the status quo unless Congress clearly states its contrary intention
in the text of the statute.”157 As aforementioned, the well-established principle
of avoiding unconstitutionality also cautions courts from interpreting a statute
to be unconstitutional unless Congress has made its intent absolutely clear. 158
Such rules and principles are of course meaningless unless they compel courts
“to choose an interpretation other than the one that it regards as the best or
most probable reading of the statute.”159 Yet despite creating “an extensive
regime of clear statement rules,”160 courts have admittedly vacillated about
the level of textual precision to satisfy them.161 Under some circumstances,
broad general language will often suffice.162 In other situations, however,
156. For a different rationale about why the Sixth Circuit has taken the correct position on the
question, see Bevilacqua, supra note 2, at II.–168 (“The Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals’ holding
in In re Greektown Holdings, LLC III that the enactment of the Bankruptcy Code does not abrogate
tribal immunity is consistent with the historical treatment and policy goals of providing immunity to
Indian tribes.”).
157. Nagle, supra note 18, at 772; see also Spector v. Norwegian Cruise Line Ltd., 545 U.S. 119,
141 (2005) (noting that “a clear statement rule that implies a special substantive limit on the application
of an otherwise unambiguous mandate”).
158. See supra note 21.
159. John F. Manning, Clear Statement Rules and the Constitution, 110 COLUM. L. REV. 399, 425
(2015); Barrett, supra note 21, at 167 (“[C]lear statement rules function no differently from other
canons that permit a court to forsake a more natural interpretation in favor of a less natural one that
protects a particular value.”).
160. Manning, supra note 159, at 401.
161. Nagle, supra note 18, at 803 (noting the distinction “between clear statement rules that can be
satisfied by evidence outside the statutory text and despite plausible alternative readings of the text,
and ‘super-strong’ clear statement rules that can only be satisfied by a specific statement in the
statutory text”).
162. Id. at 772; see also Brian G. Slocum, Canons, the Plenary Power Doctrine, and Immigration
Law, 34 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 363, 370 n.31 (2014) (“The trigger for any substantive canon is something
less than statutory clarity, but canons are not all triggered by the same level of uncertainty. Clear
statement canons, for example, are triggered by less statutory ambiguity than are tie-breaker canons.”).
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precision is a prerequisite, and Congress must use specific, targeted
language.163 A particularly strong clear statement rule may even require the
use of “magic words.”164 Many scholars term the latter version a super-strong
clear-statement rule,165 which establishes a presumption that Congress may
rebut only through unambiguous statutory text targeted at the specific
problem.166 This Article acknowledges that many scholars have not been kind
to the Supreme Court’s insistence upon clear statement rules to abrogate state,
federal, and Indian sovereign immunity.167 The Court has also generally

163. Nagle, supra note 18, at 772.
164. BRIAN G. SLOCUM, ORDINARY MEANING: A THEORY OF THE MOST FUNDAMENTAL PRINCIPLE
OF LEGAL INTERPRETATION 177 (2015); see also WILLIAM N. ESKRIDGE, PHILLIP P. FRICKLEY &
ELIZABETH GARRETT, LEGISLATION AND STATUTORY INTERPRETATION 354–55 (2d ed. 2006)
(“Sometimes the courts impose such a stringent requirement of statutory textual clarity as to require
the legislature to draft statutes with highly targeted text containing what amounts to ‘magic language’
if the legislature wishes to overcome the canon.”); Canadian Lumber Trade All. v. United States, 425
F. Supp. 2d 1321, 1328 n.12 (Ct. Intl. Trade 2006) (“A ‘magic words’ rule, also referred to as a
‘magical password,’ ‘express-reference’ or ‘express-statement’ rule, is a strict clear statement rule
which requires the use of certain words to signal a particular Congressional intent.”); Dan Meagher,
The Principle of Legality and a Common Law Bill of Rights—Clear Statement Rules Head Down
Under, 42 BROOK. J. INT’L L. 65, 67–68 (2016) (“The methodology of clear statement rules—which
require unmistakably clear statutory language (‘magic language’) to curtail or abrogate fundamental
human rights—underpins this refashioned canon.”).
165. Justice Scalia has justified something close to a super-strong clear-statement rule based largely
on the rule’s historical use. In Cipollone v. Liggett Group, for instance, he argued that American
“jurisprudence abounds with rules of ‘plain statement,’ ‘clear statement,’ and ‘narrow construction’
designed . . . to ensure that, absent unambiguous evidence of Congress’s intent, extraordinary
constitutional powers are not invoked, or important constitutional protections eliminated, or seemingly
inequitable doctrines applied.” 505 U.S. 504, 546 (1992) (Scalia, J., concurring in the judgment in
part and dissenting in part). In the abrogation of sovereign immunity context, he has also made it clear
that “since congressional elimination of state sovereign immunity is such an extraordinary act, one
would normally expect it to be explicitly decreed rather than offhandedly implied—so something like
a ‘clear statement’ rule is merely normal interpretation.” Antonin Scalia, Common-Law Courts in a
Civil-Law System: The Role of United States Federal Courts in Interpreting the Constitution and Laws,
in A MATTER OF INTERPRETATION: FEDERAL COURTS AND THE LAW 3, 29 (Amy Gutmann ed., 1997).
Clear statement rules, if adopted for non-prudential reasons, thus appear to conform with textualist
and originalist-based approaches to interpretation.
166. William N. Eskridge, Jr. & Philip Frickey, Quasi-Constitutional Law: Clear Statement Rules
as Constitutional Lawmaking, 45 VAND. L. REV. 593, 611-12 (1992); see also Nicholas R. Bednar,
The Clear-Statement Chevron Canon, 66 DEPAUL L. REV. 819, 836 (2017) (“For simplicity, scholars
generally place substantive canons in two categories: tiebreakers (weak) and clear-statement rules
(strong).”).
167. Brian Galle, Getting Spending: How to Replace Clear Statement Rules with Clear Thinking
about Conditional Grants of Federal Funds, 37 CONN. L. REV. 155, 158 (2004) (“The difficulty with
the clear statement rule is that it sharply restricts courts’ power to interpret constitutionally-inspired
federal lawmaking flexibly so as to fulfill constitutional values.”). I should note that Judge Amy
Coney Barrett has argued that the application of clear statement rules in the sovereign immunity
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repudiated the need for particular statutory labels, often employing the phrase
“magic words” disparagingly.168 Yet the Court has recognized that the
“standard principles of statutory construction do not have their usual force in
cases involving Indian law.”169 The Indian tribal sovereign immunity context
is simply one that is both different in degree and kind.
A magic words clear statement rule in the Indian tribal sovereign
immunity context would not be premised on prudential or normative values.
The rule instead would rest on the dubious proposition that Congress
possesses the constitutional authority to abrogate Indian tribal sovereign
immunity as an original matter. Establishing clear statement rules on
constitutional principle has received some scholarly support. Professor John
Nagle, for instance, has argued that when “the Court has decided not to
enforce fully a constitutional command through judicial review, then a clear
statement rule with respect to statutes that may violate that command is
justified.”170 Professor John Manning has likewise suggested that “[i]n areas
in which the Court has pervasive doubts about its ability to recover firm
constitutional meaning, perhaps clear statement rules do provide a gentler
alternative to Marbury-style judicial review.”171 This logic should be applied
to the Indian tribal sovereign immunity context. If the Court has constitutional
doubt about Congress’s authority to accomplish a statutory end, then the Court
should make it especially cumbersome for Congress to achieve that
constitutionally questionable goal.172
Congress must therefore be

context is best understood as “a conscious application of a time-honored rule of sovereign exemption
to a new kind of incursion on sovereignty.” Barrett, supra note 21, at 150. She has also posited that
the clear-statement-sovereignty rule is “the starkest example of early courts both describing and
applying a maxim justifying an interpretation other than the most natural reading of the statute.” Id.
at 157. This historical practice thus lends additional credibility to this Article’s proposed amplified
clear statement rule.
168. Id. at 166 n.274 (“Characterization of a canon’s application as a ‘magic words’ requirement is
always pejorative; the Court itself disclaims the authority to so discipline Congress.”); see also Key
Tronic Corp. v. United States, 511 U.S. 809, 823 (1994) (Scalia, J., dissenting) (arguing that Congress
need not incant the magic phrase attorney’s fees’ in order to provide for their recovery); Gade v. Nat’l
Solid Waste Mgmt. Ass’n, 505 U.S. 88, 112 (1992) (Kennedy, J., concurring) (arguing that preemption
inquiry should turn on Congress’s clear and manifest purpose, not on magic words).
169. Montana v. Blackfeet Tribe Nations, 471 U.S. 759, 766 (1985).
170. Nagle, supra note 18, at 810.
171. Manning, supra note 159, at 450.
172. Professor John Manning has suggested that defenders of clear statement rules often argue that
the rule is “simply another permissible technique for enforcing the Constitution.” Id. at 402. The
magic words clear statement rule in the tribal immunity context can thus be viewed as the Court’s
willingness to enforce the original meaning of the Constitution in a backhanded way.
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unequivocally clear that it intends for a constitutional dubious interpretation.
Indeed, the ordinary assumption is that Congress is presumed not to be
attempting to pass unconstitutional statutes.173 Resting the proposed magic
words clear statement rule on this premise grants the rule legitimacy, as it can
be traced meaningfully to the Constitution—specifically, original doubt about
the Indian plenary power doctrine.174
Importantly, a magic words clear statement rule would also allow the
Court to avoid thorny stare decisis questions as the proposed rule, in theory,
would make the abrogation issue arise with less regularity. A magic words
clear statement rule in this context thus “affords room for adjustment without
the institutionally costly step of overruling or spuriously distinguishing
hardened constitutional doctrine.”175 The rule can function as a limited
replacement to the alternative option of outright overruling dubious
precedent.176 The rule can thus be used as a tool, wielded by judges, to enforce
a dormant constitutional principle.177
A magic words clear statement rule makes practical sense in this
particular context as well. Clear statement rules are designed to focus
legislative intent on the specificity of statutory text, as they “incent cautious
173. See Paul A. Diller, When Congress Passes an Intentionally Unconstitutional Law: The Military
Commissions Act of 2006, 61 SMU L. REV. 281, 290 (2008) (discussing the presumption of
constitutionality).
174. Manning, supra note 159, at 404 (arguing “that if the legitimacy of constitutionally inspired
clear statement rules depends on the plausibility of tracing them meaningfully to the Constitution.”);
see id. (noting that “the defining feature of constitutionally inspired clear statement rules is that even
when a given interpretation of a statute would not violate the constitutional provision(s) from which
the triggering value emanates, that interpretation might still be said to collide with the background
value itself”).
175. Id. at 450 (arguing that “if the Court invoked clear statement rules or similar remedial devices
only when there remained a residuum of doubt after full adjudication of the underlying constitutional
question using conventional methods of constitutional exegesis” would carry some weight).
176. As discussed supra note 23, a magic words clear statement rule can be thought of, in some
ways, as a corollary to the canon of constitutional avoidance. That canon is founded on “the principle
that federal statutes should be read to avoid raising constitutional questions, even when those questions
might be resolved in favor of the statutes’ constitutionality.” Caleb Nelson, What is Textualism?, 91
VA. L. REV. 347, 387 (2005). Admittedly, “the canon telling interpreters to avoid even constitutional
questions is hard to defend in terms of the enacting legislature’s likely intent; at least in modern times,
there is no particular reason to presume that members of Congress systematically try to avoid gray
areas and to refrain from pushing their power to its limits.” Id. (emphasis omitted). Yet in this case,
a magic words clear statement rule would simply be moving the intent target; not avoiding the intent
question. Stated differently, Congress would have to press the magic-words-intent button to trigger
abrogation. If that button is statutorily pressed, the Court has no choice but to wrestle with the
constitutional question posed.
177. Kiel Brennan-Marquez, Magic Words, 23 WM. & MARY BILL RTS. J. 759, 774 (2015).
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drafting.”178 Such rules thus impose a “clarity tax” on legislators, requiring
them to express their intentions in anything less than exact magic words.179 In
most scenarios, a magic-word-specificity requirement may admittedly be an
undue exercise of judicial power. Now Judge, then-Professor, Amy Coney
Barrett argued that “such an aggressive use of clear statement rules violates
the baseline rule of legislative supremacy.”180 Yet requiring Congress to use
exceptionally clear textual language to achieve a statutory outcome that
threatens to intrude upon sensitive constitutional areas, like the abrogation of
tribal sovereign immunity for instance, may be an exception. This is
particularly true when dealing with terms like “domestic government.”
In the Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1978, the term “domestic government”
is buried at the end of a long list defining what constitutes a governmental
unit.181 When legislators passed the Act, it is doubtful that most stopped,
paused, and pondered whether the phrase “domestic government” abrogated
the sovereign immunity of Indian tribes. Judicial insistence upon magicword-statutory clarity in the tribal sovereign immunity context may focus
legislative intent on this precise question, while also increasing the burden of
enacting legislation that abrogates tribal sovereign immunity. A magic words
clear statement rule would impose a clarity tax “upon legislation that seeks to
achieve a constitutionally disfavored result,”182 setting a price Congress must
pay before intruding upon constitutional values.183 In other words, a magic
words clear statement rule requires Congress to specifically focus on certain
constitutional values before disturbing them.184
As there exists reason to doubt the original correctness of the Indian
plenary power doctrine, courts should adopt a magic words clear statement
rule to make it more challenging for Congress to exercise this dubious power.
This rule would force Congress to focus specifically on tribal sovereign
immunity before abrogating it. It also provides an alternative option to the

178. Id. at 772; Nagle, supra note 18, at 805 (“Such rules protect special values by requiring
deliberate legislative consideration before a court will conclude that the legislature decided to act
contrary to those values.”).
179. Manning, supra note 159, at 403.
180. Barrett, supra note 21, at 166–67.
181. See 11 U.S.C. § 101(27).
182. Manning, supra note 159, at 425.
183. Matthew C. Stephenson, The Price of Public Action: Constitutional Doctrine and the Judicial
Manipulation of Legislative Enactment Costs, 118 YALE L.J. 2, 11–16 (2008).
184. Nagle, supra note 18, at 803–04.
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judicially costly route of overruling precedent.185 If the statute does contain
the magic words then Congress has elected to press the issue—an attempt to
exercise a power it may, as an original matter, not even possess. 186
VI. CONCLUSION
While probably surprising to some, the Court’s originalist jurists most
frequently question Congress’s use of its plenary power authority over Indian
tribes. They are also the most hesitant to strip tribes of their sovereign
immunity. In a recent case, Justice Gorsuch, writing for the majority, stated
that “[d]etermining the limits on the sovereign immunity held by Indian tribes
is a grave question; the answer will affect all tribes, not just the one before
us.”187 Basing his premise on the Constitutional text and founding era
contextual history, Justice Thomas views the plenary power doctrine as “a
power grab.”188 In light of both the historical context of the Constitution’s
ratification and the Constitution’s text itself, these Justices appear wise to
doubt the original correctness of the Indian plenary power doctrine. 189
Indeed, original doubt about the Indian plenary power doctrine makes
constitutional sense. The absence of any express federal power to abrogate
Indian sovereign immunity is logical, given that “when the Constitution was
drafted, Indian tribes were highly autonomous and viewed as a serious
external threat to the security of the new nation.”190 This means that Indian

185. Practically speaking, this approach calls for the court’s inquiry to end, and the Indian tribe’s
sovereign immunity be maintained, whenever the statute does not contain the requisite magic words
(i.e. Indian tribes or a closely associated term).
186. David L. Shapiro, Continuity and Change in Statutory Interpretation, 67 N.Y.U. L. REV. 921,
960 (1992) (suggesting that the most significant canons used by the Supreme Court reflect a preference
for continuity that “is in fact a useful guideline in discerning legislative purpose”).
187. Upper Skagit Indian Tribe v. Lundgren, 138 S. Ct. 1649, 1654 (2018).
188. Ledford, supra note 70, at 197. Justice Thomas has rejected the Court’s holding “that the
Constitution grants to Congress plenary power to calibrate the ‘metes and bounds of tribal
sovereignty.’” United States v. Lara, 541 U.S. 193, 215 (2004) (Thomas, J., concurring).
189. Ledford, supra note 70, at 202.
190. Cleveland, supra note 68, at 26. Indeed, the tribal-federal relationship is textually rooted in
treaty negotiations—a mechanism that is explicitly outlined in Article II. Ledford, supra note 70, at
202; see also Sorenson, supra note 39, at 99 (noting that “the executive treatymaking power in Article
II, Section 2, though not explicitly mentioning tribal nations, also played an important role in federal
and tribal relations from the founding until 1871”). Up until the turn of the twentieth century,
moreover, “U.S. power over the Indians had been considered limited to actions authorized by the
Commerce, War, and Treaty Clauses.” Cleveland, supra note 68, at 73.
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tribal sovereign immunity is properly regarded as constitutional backdrop. 191
Although itself not contained in the text of the Constitution, 192 the principle
was explicitly incorporated by reference, understood to be independently
insulated from congressional change, and for nearly a century imposed limits
on congressional power.193 Federal Indian law today thus concerns legal
doctrines unmoored to text or history and stands “contrary to the basic
assumptions of our common law tradition, which forbid nonconsensual
deprivations of the fundamental interests of those who have not through their
fault contributed to the problems of others.”194
This Article’s proposed magic words clear statement rule is premised on
the dubious original correctness of the Indian plenary power doctrine.
Original doubt provides a basis for the Court to restrict Congress’s uncertain
authority to abrogate tribal sovereign immunity. As this Article contends, the
magic words clear statement rule should govern the question whether a statute
has abrogated tribunal immunity. The legislature must use magic words
(expressly mentioning Indian tribes or a closely associated term) that leaves
no doubt about Congress’s intent to abrogate tribal immunity.195 This

191. Stephen E. Sachs, Constitutional Backdrops, 80 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1813, 1816 (2012)
(defining “constitutional backdrops” as “rules of law that aren’t derivable from the Constitution’s text,
but instead are left unaltered by the text, and in fact are protected by the text from various kinds of
legal change”).
192. Seielstad, supra note 27, at 683 (“[T]he doctrine has long been recognized by all three branches
of the federal government as an essential and inherent element of tribal sovereignty.”); see also Santa
Clara Pueblo v. Martinez, 436 U.S. 49, 58 (1978) (“Indian tribes have long been recognized as
possessing the common-law immunity from suit traditionally enjoyed by sovereign powers.”); Steele,
supra note 29, at 678 (“The Supreme Court has affirmed that tribal sovereignty does not derive from
a delegation of federal authority, but endures as aboriginal authority that predates the Constitution and
has never been extinguished.”).
193. Sachs, supra note 191, at 1888 (“Constitutional backdrops are rules of law that function like
constitutional rules, but are not contained in the Constitution. These include rules that were explicitly
incorporated by reference, that were independently insulated from change, or that durably limit the
scope of the text’s language.”); see also Krakoff, supra note 2, at 529 (“Tribes’ political status is
woven into the text and structure of our Constitution.”).
194. Philip P. Frickey, Doctrine, Context, Institutional Relationships, and Commentary: The
Malaise of Federal Indian Law through the Lens of Lone Wolf, 38 TULSA L. REV. 5, 9 (2013); see also
Pearl, supra note 18, at 335 (“This Article argues that the implication from the enumerated authorities
and separation of powers compels the conclusion that Indian tribes were distinct communities
independent of the newly formed United States.”); Bevilacqua, supra note 2, at II.–159 (“Indian tribes
possess a level of common-law sovereign immunity that can only be abrogated through actions by
Congress or through waiver by the tribe itself.”).
195. In this way, the magic words clear statement rule would permit a judge to forgo the ‘best’
interpretation of a statutory provision in favor of constraining Congress’s authority to exercise an
uncertain power. Bednar, supra note 166, at 836.
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proposed rule supports the proposition that “originalism actually provides a
basis to advance a strong vision of tribal sovereignty and an exceptionally
limited federal role in tribal communities.”196 It also recognizes that the “story
of federal Indian law is a study in the art of using the shards of adverse
precedent to cobble together enduring arguments and principles from what
remains.”197 It may finally be time to chart a different course. A good place
to start would be to constrain a congressional power that does not derive from
either the Constitution’s text or historical practice. A magic words clear
statement rule would do just that.
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